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INTRODUCTION

Nearly 125 years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Paul v. Virginia,1 adopted the view that state commissioners and agencies are pri1. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183-86 (1869) (noting that insurance contracts were "local
transactions ... governed by ... local law" and that the business of insurance was not
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madly responsible for regulating the insurance industry.2 Since Paul,
state insurance commissions have had to resolve a variety of insurancerelated conflicts and problems. Congress, however, has intervened only
once to correct a problem insurers described as a national crisis.

Seventy-six years after Paul, the Supreme Court ruled in United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 3 that a transaction between an insurer and a policyholder from different states constitutes interstate commerce and is therefore subject to federal antitrust laws and regulations.4
South-Eastern Underwriterseffectively overruled Paul and created major
turbulence within the insurance industry. Congress responded to the crisis 5 by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act (the Act).6
commerce under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and holding that Congress had no authority to regulate the insurance industry).
2. See generally Frederick Rose, Congressional Proposals on Insurance Would End
Primacy of State Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1991, at B4. See also Insurance Company
Solvency: Hearingon Insurance Company Solvency and Reporting Methods Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing on Insurance Solvency] (statement of
Sen. Metzenbaum) ("Under current laws, State regulators have the primary responsibility
for the regulation of premium rates and the availability of insurance, for the regulation of
investments by insurance companies, and for the solvency of 2,400 life insurers and 3,850
property/casualty companies.").
3. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
4. Id. at 561-62.
5. See Jere W. Glover, Should Congress Repeal McCarran-Ferguson?:It's Time to
Repeal McCarran-Ferguson,AtrmTRusT, Summer 1987, at 31, 33 ("'[Florty years ago the
insurance industry managed to persuade Congress that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
essential, both to preserve the states' autonomy to regulate and tax insurance, and to permit beneficial cooperation among insurers."' (statement of James C. Miller, III, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission)); see also S.J. Res. 5482-01, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG.
REc. 9735 (1987) ("[I]n 1945, Congress, apprehensive about the effect of South-Eastern
Underwriters on the powers of states to tax and regulate insurance, adopted the McCarranFerguson Act granting the insurance industry broad exemption from most provisions of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, including the proscriptions against such anticompetitive practices as price-fixing, agreements not to compete, monopolization, tying agreements, and a
wide range of other conduct that is unlawful for nearly every firm outside the insurance
industry ....

).

6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988). The Act states:
§ 1011 Declaration of Policy
Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
§ 1012. Regulation by State law; Federal law relating specifically to insurance;
applicability of certain Federal laws after June 30, 1948
(a) State regulation
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to
the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
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As of this writing, consumer groups, lobbyists, and other interested
parties are arguing that "turmoil" 7-more serious than the South-Eastern
Underwriters-generatedchaos-is again crippling the nation's insurance
industry. Some state prosecutors, for example, maintain that "numerous
big insurance companies illegally conspired to control the insurance mar'8
ket during the mid-1980s," resulting in "skyrocketing insurance rates.
(b) Federal regulation
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided,That after June 30, 1948, the Act of
July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914,
known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
Law.
§ 1013. Suspension until June 30, 1948, of application of certain Federal Laws;
Sherman Act applicable to agreements to, or acts or, boycott, coercion, or
intimidation
(a) Until June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Act of June 19, 1936, known as the Robinson-Patman AntiDiscrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the
conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.
§ 1014. Effect on other laws
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to affect in any manner
the application to the business of insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935, as
amended, known as the National Labor Relations Act, or the Act of June 25,
1938, as amended, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the Act of
June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
§ 1015. "State" defined
As used in this chapter, the term "State" includes the several States, Alaska,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of Columbia.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (citations and notes omitted).
7. See Rose, supra note 2, at B4. One observer noted that "'[w]ith the turmoil in the
industry right now, this is no time for amateurs in insurance regulation."' Id. (quoting
William McCartney, Nebraska Commissioner of Insurance, Vice President, National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
8. Richard B. Schmitt, Court Revives Antitrust Suit Against Insurers, WALL ST. J.,
June 19, 1991, at B4 ("The states had asserted the companies conspired to limit liability
coverage and drive up rates for businesses and governments, amounting to an illegal boycott that limited the availability of liability insurance in the U.S."); see also Paul M. Barrett, Justices to Rule on Bid by States to Sue Insurers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1992, at A2, A6
("The attorneys general of 19 states, led by California, filed antitrust lawsuits against four
major U.S. primary insurers .... A federal trial judge dismissed the lawsuits, concluding
that defendants were protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act .... The Supreme Court
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Also, consumer advocates stress that the industry continually abuses insurance consumers with impunity; they note that "policyholders in the
last decade have had to confront either three- to five-fold rate increases
9
or the cancellation of their policies."

Perhaps the strongest evidence of an insurance crisis is insurers' insolvency data. Consumer lobbyists and others observe that "[t]he number of
1°
insurance failures has increased alarmingly over the last several years."
For instance, at least eighty-five life & health and 226 property & casualty

insurance insolvencies occurred during the 1980s. 11 More important, the

failure of some of the nation's largest and most prestigious insurers 12 has
[on October 5, 1992] agreed to hear the insurers' appeal of that decision."); Richard W.
Stevenson, Court Ruling Sets Back Insurers, N.Y. TimIEs, June 19, 1991, at D1 (discussing
the Ninth Circuit's ruling "in a case brought by 19 states against 32 American and foreign
insurance companies" in which the court "found that a lower court had erred in dismissing
the case largely on the ground that the insurers were exempt from antitrust suits").
9. Sanford M. Gage & Johnathan T. Zackey, The Insurance Wars: The Battle Over
McCarran-Ferguson-RepealItd, THE BRIEF, Winter 1989, at 11, 13 ("[The insurance industry has exhibited a cavalier attitude toward consumers and a bloated self-confidence in
the face of state regulation. As a result of these abuses ....[a]cross-the-board cancellations have become commonplace."); see also Paulette Thomas, House Panel Votes to Curb
Insurer Links, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1991, at A3 ("Consumer groups contend that the law,
which allows insurance companies to share actuarial information, also lets them fix prices
and shield themselves from antitrust suit.").
10. Regulation of Insurance Companies and the Role of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Policy Research and Insurance
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(1991) [hereinafter Hearingon Insurance and NAIC's Role] (statement of Rep. Erdreich).
11. Id. Representative Ben Erdreich, Chairman of the Subcommittee, stated:
During the [1970s], there were 108 property/casualty insolvencies; during the
1980s, there were 226 insolvencies, with a significant increase beginning in 1984.
During the first half of the 1980s, there were 20 life/health company insolvencies;
during the last half there were 65 insolvencies, with 26 in 1989 and 13 in 1990.
Id. (statement of Rep. Erdreich).
12. See Paulette Thomas, Dingell Unveils Insurance Industry Bill That Would Impose
U.S. Rules on Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1992, at A6 ("Mr. Dingell said that last year's
collapse of Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. and First Executive Corp.'s Executive Life
Insurance Co., as well as shortcomings in state regulation, convinced him that a federal
system is needed.. . 'to correct obvious deficiencies in solvency regulation before an industrywide crisis occurs' ... ."); see also Susan Pulliam, Regulators Draft Plan on Mutual
Benefit After Insurers Reject a Group Bailout, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1992, at B6 ("New
Jersey regulators are devising a new bailout plan for Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.
after a group of the nation's largest life insurers rejected a proposal for them to foot the
entire $800 million bill, said the state's insurance commissioner."); Susan Pulliam, Met Life
Agrees to Manage Mutual Benefit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1991, at B4. Pulliam stated:
Metropolitan... and Prudential Insurance Co. of America have begun working
with regulators on a plan to restructure Mutual Benefit, the Newark, N.J.-based
insurer seized by state regulators ....After the failure of
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generated much anxiety among all levels of government 3 and contributed to the view that disarray permeates the insurance industry.
Obviously, whether one labels the problem a "crisis" or "turmoil,"
something is gravely wrong within "the $2 trillion industry."' 14 This discontent over the state of the insurance industry has caused a plea for
"Congress to 'do something' about insurance" and conditions plaguing
the insurance industry.'5 But what should be done to cure the reported
ills? Both consumers and consumer advocates believe the answer is simple: amend or repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 6
One advocate has observed correctly that fear of adverse economic
conditions influenced Congress' decision to enact the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Those concerns, however, no longer exist, leading some to suggest that the Act should be amended.' 7 Others, however, stress that the
insurance industry should be subjected to the full scope of federal antiBaldwin-United Corp. in the early 1980s, Metropolitan and other insurers also
stepped forward to assume some of its liabilities and cover part of its shortfall in
capital.
Id.
13. See Robert D. Haase & Gregory C,Krohm, The Ailing Health Insurance Industry,
THE BRIEF, Winter 1991, at 14, 15 ("Not only is the number of insolvencies growing; the
assessments levied on the remaining members of the industry have risen even more rapidly .... The insurance industry's inability to shoulder assessments ... has raised questions

about the need for alternative methods of funding insolvencies."). Constance B. Foster,
Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner, stated:
There is no doubt that insurance company solvency is of compelling interest on
both the national and state levels. The recent publicity surrounding the financial
difficulties of Executive Life Insurance Company, First Capital Life Insurance
Company and Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company illustrate [sic] the real life
problems faced by policyholders of insolvent or troubled companies. As we have
seen ...people can be hurt by insurance company failures.
Hearing on Insurance and NAIC's Role, supra note 10, at 100 (statement of Constance B.
Foster).
14. Paulette Thomas, Powerful Insurance Lobby Is Being Fragmented Just When It
Needs to Put a Premium on Unity, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1991, at A16.
15. Edward 0. Correia, The Antitrust Laws and Insurance:Applying FederalPolicy to
a State-Regulated Industry, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 813, 815 (1991).
16. See generally Gage & Zackey, supra note 9 (arguing for repeal of the McCarranFerguson Act); Glover, supra note 5, at 33 (arguing for a "complete revision" of the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
17. Glover, supra note 5, at 33.
[Ilt is a tragic irony for consumers that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not needed
to accomplish any of the Act's original goals. The time is ripe for a complete
revision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. No longer is there any need to unjustly
burden small businesses with ever higher insurance rates. The antitrust exemption for the business of insurance is overbroad and fosters an anticompetitive
market .... Legislation tailored more closely to the requirements of the industry
should be enacted to replace the Act.
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trust laws.18 They note that "[m]ajor American financial corporations,
such as banks, investment companies, securities firms, and the savings
and loan industry are subject to extensive federal regulation."' 9 Therefore, consumer advocates believe the Act should be repealed outright because the insurance industry presents no compelling justification for
either a partial or total exemption from antitrust scrutiny.2 °
Finally, consumer lobbyists argue that Congress should "create a federal agency endowed with broad powers over state regulators in [all] insurance activities."' 2 ' The creation of an oversight agency "would end the
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1992). Section 1012(b) states in pertinent part:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided,That after June 30, 1948, the Act of
July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914,
known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
Law.
Id. (second emphasis added) (citation omitted).
19. Correia, supra note 15, at 819. "Congress could simply decide that the insurance
industry is too large, too complex, and too national in scope (or even international in some
cases)...." Id. Removing the industry's federal antitrust immunity "would... establish[ ]
uniform federal standards to certain aspects of insurance-e.g., solvency, risk pools, and
consumer disclosure." Id. (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., Gage & Zackey, supra note 9, at 13.
Under the Sherman Act, geographical or territorial market allocations are illegal per se; ... they are conclusively presumed to violate the prohibition on contracts in restraint of trade. Yet, because of its antitrust exemption, the insurance
industry is able to make agreements in which companies agree to assign certain
territories to each other ....
The insurance industry euphemistically refers to tying arrangements as "packaging," which means that in order to get the line of insurance desired, consumers
must buy other lines of less popular or less desirable insurance, often against their
will. Under antitrust law, such tying arrangements are per se illegal.
Id. The authors argue that insurance companies would never engage in such exploitive
conduct if they did not have antitrust immunity. Id. Kenneth G. Starling, former Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, remarked on the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the state regulation of the business of insurance:
The Department [of Justice] has always been opposed to antitrust exemptions
in the absence of a strong showing by those who advocate immunity that there is
an actual or potential conflict between the antitrust laws and some other societal
goal. The nation's fundamental economic policy of competition, promoted by the
antitrust laws, produces the maximum amount of consumer welfare.
Kenneth G. Starling, Address Before the 1987 Law Conference of the Reinsurance Association of America 1 (Sept. 18, 1987) (transcript on file with the Catholic University Law
Review).
21. Rose, supra note 2, at B4. "[Flederal oversight has gained political stature with a
recent burst of the largest insurance failures in the nation's history and with widening concern that the patchwork of state oversight may be inadequate." Id.
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123-year primacy of state regulation in insurance," 22 and would have the
power to establish "a form of federally-chartered insurance company be3
holden to no one state."
Arguments against amending or repealing the McCarran-Ferguson Act
abound as well. First, defenders of the industry claim that any reform
"could make insurers less stable financially and could actually impose
tougher antitrust rules on insurers than on any other industries. '24 Moreover, opponents of reform argue that a "[r]epeal of the limited exemption
from the Sherman Act will ... create instability in rate making and will
reduce the number of insurers competing in the marketplace. 2 5
Supporters of the McCarran-Ferguson Act also assert that "[flederal
banking regulation has not prevented bank failures, nor has federal securities regulation deterred insider trading., 26 Furthermore, opponents con22. Id.
23. Id. "Among the most striking powers of the new corporation would be the authority to allow industry self-regulatory organizations, monitored by the corporation, to approve members for interstate business in insurance." Id.
24. Thomas, supra note 9, at 4. Insurers argue that any repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act would hurt the insurance industry:
It would subject the industry to Federal Trade Commission consumer provisions,
as well as [to] antitrust law. Insurance advertising, for example, could fall under
FTC scrutiny .... Relationships between insurance companies and insurance
agents that spell out the sorts of products that agents may sell could be regulated,
as well.
Id.
25. Robert S. Seiler, McCarran-Fergusonis Not the Problem, ANTITRUST, Summer
1987, at 31, 32. Mr. Seiler stressed that "McCarran immunity has not resulted in a noncompetitive marketplace. Rather it has helped create an industry which is atomistic and
which has no barriers to entry .... " Id.
26. Franklin W. Nutter, The Insurance Wars: The Battle Over McCarran-FergusonKeep It!, THE BRIEF, Winter 1989, at 10, 15; Seiler, supra note 25, at 33 ("Federal regulation has not prevented bank and [savings and loans] insolvencies or insider trading. In
addition, insurance is the sum of local transactions reflecting differing economic, social,
and political conditions. A federal regulator cannot, and will not, be able to cope with
those differences."). In fact, defenders of the insurance industry argue that the "dual system" of state and federal regulation is partially responsible for the problems in the banking
and S&L industries. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 12, at A6. Representative John Dingell
introduced a bill in the House of Representatives in 1992 aimed at regulating the insurance
industry. H.R. 4900, The Federal Insurance Solvency Act of 1992. 138 Cong. Rec. E 1035
(daily ed. April 10, 1992). Under the bill, certain aspects are left to the states:
States would continue to monitor the safety of insurance companies that chose
not to join the federal system ....
States, moreover, also would continue to
regulate rates and marketing rules.
But such a dual system is what the [insurance] industry fears most. "If there is
any lesson of the S&Ls and banks, it's that there are serious problems with a dual
system," said William McCartney, president of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and insurance commissioner for Nebraska. "You wind up
with no one in charge."
Thomas, supra note 12, at A6.
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tend that "[r]epealing the [Act] may not make insurance significantly
more widely available at lower prices. In particular, repeal [may not]

solve the crisis in certain lines of property/casualty insurance."27 Within
the past six years, Congress has introduced several bills proposing to re-

peal or modify the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2
This Article is not written to stimulate debate about whether a major
insurance crisis exists, whether the insurance industry should be subjected
to the full scope of federal antitrust laws, or whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be repealed outright. Much already has been written
about each issue.2 9 Instead, this Article presents an historical and empiri27. Starling, supra note 20, at 5-6.
28. See, e.g., S. 430, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (modifying the antitrust exemption
applicable to insurance industry); H.R. 10, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (same); S. 719,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (same); S. 1299, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (same); S. 804,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., (1987) (proposing Insurance Competition Act of 1987 to strike all
deference to "insurance" in the McCarran-Ferguson Act); S. 80, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (proposing repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act); see also The McCarran-Ferguson
Act-State Antitrust Action Against Insurance Agencies: Hearings on S.1299 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); To Repeal or Revise the McCarran-FergusonAct: Hearingson S.80 and S.1299 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
29. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis,
48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 399 (1987) (analyzing causes and possible cures for the crises in
liability insurance cost and availability); Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How
the McCarran-FergusonAct Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-CasualtyInsurance
Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 397, 397 (1988) (suggesting the cause of any crisis in insurance
rates is due to the cyclical nature of the industry resulting from the McCarran-Ferguson
Act); Robert G. Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development On Insurance: The Availability/Affordability Crisis and Its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U. L. REV.285, 286 (1988)
(focusing on the development of tort law in the area of products liability and its impact on
the availability and affordability of insurance); David Burrow & John E. Collins, Insurance
"Crisis"-Texas Style: The Case for Insurance Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 759, 761, 793
(1987) (examining the Texas insurance crisis and suggesting various modifications, including the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Richard N. Clarke et al., Sources of the
Crisis inLiability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 368, 394-95
(1988) (focusing on the economic aspects of insurance and concluding that a repeal of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act would have limited effect in solving the "limited" crisis that exists); Joseph E. Coughlin, Losing McCarranAct Protection Through "Boycott, Coercion, or
Intimidation," 54 ANTrrRusT L.J. 1281, 1282 (1986) (discussing the proper reading of section 3(b) exemption of McCarran-Ferguson); Frank P. Darr, Federal Claims in Insurance
Insolvencies, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 601, 603 (1989) (examining state and federal regulation
of insurance company insolvencies); Robert W. Hammesfahr, Antitrust Exemptions Applicable to the Business of Insurance Other Than the McCarran-FergusonAct: The State Action Exemption and The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine,54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1321, 1321 (1986)
(relating the state action exemption and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to the McCarranFerguson Act); Nelson Lacey, The Competitiveness of the Property-CasualtyInsuranceIndustry: A Look at Market Equity Values and Premium Prices, 5 YALE J. ON REG.501, 502
(1988) (discussing market equity as superior to profitability in evaluating the financial performance of insurance firms); Peter A. Lefkin, Shattering Some Myths on the Insurance
Liability Crisis:A Comment on the Article by Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith, and Simon, 5
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cal analysis of a repeatedly overlooked but significant phenomenon: the
prominent role of federal courts in areas of insurance regulation. Without doubt, "[clourts have scrutinized many long-standing insurance industry practices, such as peer review mechanisms, agreements with hospitals,
doctors or health care providers and agreements with auto body shops."30
Furthermore, rulings by both the Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts often affect the economic health of consumers and insurers
more seriously than state insurance commissioners' regulatory and en31
forcement schemes.
More disturbing, however, are the frequently ambiguous, poorly reasoned, and inconsistent decisions of federal appellate courts.32 It is only
J. ON REG. 417, 418 (1988) (finding that changing standards in tort liability results in
an insurance crisis and concluding that a limited antitrust exemption is necessary and beneficial to the public); Banks McDowell, Competition as a Regulatory Mechanism in Insurance, 19 CONN. L. REV. 287, 280 (1987) (discussing the negative ramifications of an
unregulated insurance industry); George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understandingof Insurance,63 TUL. L. REv. 999, 1002 (1989) (indicating that antitrust claims
against insurers hinder the availability of insurance coverage); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455,
458 (1988) (proposing a model of a competitive insurance market to solve the insurance
crisis); Eliot M. Blake, Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and
Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 403 (1988) (discussing the
relationship between tort litigation and the insurance industry); Frank T. Herdman, Comment, Doctors, Insurers, and the Antitrust Laws, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 789, 789 (1989) (applying the McCarran-Ferguson exemption for insurance to health care providers); John H.
Leskera, Comment, Change From "Pure" ComparativeNegligence to "Modified" Comparative Negligence-Will It Alleviate the Insurance Crisis?, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 753, 755
(1988) (indicating that changing from pure comparative negligence to modified comparative negligence may alleviate a state's insurance crisis); Nancy L. Manzer, Comment, 1986
Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitationson
Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 652 (1988) (concluding that a limit on
joint and several tort liability is an appropriate response to the insurance crisis rather than
limiting non-economic damage awards); Nancy R. Page, Comment, Risky Business: Consumer Protection in the Insurance Industry, 23 HARV. J. ON LEois. 287, 280 (1986) (concluding that federal regulation of insurance is necessary to protect consumers); Sara R.
Slaughter, Comment, Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses to the Director and Officer
Liability Insurance Crisis, 63 IND. L.J. 181, 182-83 (1988) (discussing the insurance crisis
with respect to director and officer liability insurance).
30. Nutter, supra note 26, at 15; see also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS,
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 8.1(c), at 938 (1988) ("Insurance transactions and institutions are
often subject to judicial scrutiny .... ).
31. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 30, at 938. "The influence of the courts on
insurance transactions through doctrinal developments has sometimes been considerably
more significant than the enforcement of regulatory measures by the commissioner of insurance." Id.
32. Cf. id. § 8.1(b), at 937 ("There is no definitive answer in regard to what tests or
standards should or will be applied by the federal courts . . . ."); id. § 8.3(a), at 943 n.1
("Judicial decisions interpreting legislative definitions of insurance frequently are ... relaYALE
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too clear that insurance consumers, insurers, and consumer advocates are
affected severely when courts issue such rulings. Moreover, insurance activists apparently do not understand that inconsistently applied and ambiguous judicial rulings are implicated in many of the problems facing the
insurance industry, 33 and that preserving, amending, or repealing the McCarran-Ferguson Act will not necessarily correct the insurance industry's
ills. The movement to maintain or alter the Act is misplaced; rather, efforts should focus on removing federal courts from all areas of insurance
regulation.
This Article presents both historical and empirical evidence to support
the view that the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts are inferior
forums for resolving insurance-related controversies. It is amply apparent that "inferior" is an appropriate description of federal courts that
have tried to harmonize federal antitrust, insolvency, and "superpriority"
statutes with key sections of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Part I presents a brief overview of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the
Act's allocation of power among state governments, federal agencies, and
courts. In particular, Part I examines the origin and breadth of the
courts' power to regulate the insurance industry.
Parts II, III, and IV offer several discussions of intercircuit conflicts
involving key provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Specifically,
Part II discusses the intercircuit conflict over the definition of "business
of insurance." Does the definition encompass both "for-profit" and
"nonprofit" insurers? Or are the nation's Blue Cross and Blue Shield
companies engaged in the "business of insurance"? Unquestionably, a
serious conflict exists among federal courts of appeals over these and similar questions. Moreover, this disagreement is producing significant
problems for both consumers and the insurance industry.
Part III examines important antitrust issues surrounding the insurance
industry and the business of insurance. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
clearly states that federal antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
Law." 4 The Act also states that the Sherman Act shall apply to any
tively imprecise and generally provide little guidance in regard to . . . statutory
provisions.").
33. See generally E. Neil Young et al., Insurance Contract Interpretation:Issues and
Trends, 625 11s. L.J. 71, 72-73 (1975) (observing correctly that "[a] continuing legal conflict
[exists] between insurance companies and policyholders" and that courts often referee this
conflict; consequently, judges "twist[ I existing doctrines," apply "inconsistent doctrines,"
and create an "untidy [body of law] where neither party to the insurance contract knows
precisely what the contract does or does not provide until after the fact of litigation").

34. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
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insurance-related agreement or activity involving boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 35 Federal appellate courts, however, are profoundly divided
over the types of insurance activities and agreements which are prohibited under the Sherman Act. Part III examines this important issue highlighting the effects of poorly reasoned boycott decisions in cases involving
Blue Cross and Blue Shield companies.
Part IV discusses the issue of federal preemption. Assuming that a
company is engaged in the business of insurance and that state insurance
law effectively regulates the insurer's activity, does the McCarran Act's
"state action" provision 36 preempt all federal statutes which attempt to
regulate or outlaw offensive insurance-related conduct? Stated differently, does the McCarran Act prevent a plaintiff from commencing an
action against an insurer under federal insolvency and superpriority statutes? Some courts say yes, while others say no.
Finally, Part V presents a case study of the disposition of 275 McCarran-Ferguson cases in federal courts between 1941 and 1993. An empirical analysis reveals that the Supreme Court as well as federal appellate
courts permit extra-legal factors to influence whether a case is decided in
favor of state insurance commissioners and insurance consumers or in
favor of insurance companies. The study reveals that federal courts are
deciding a variety of insurance-related questions on the basis of factors
which have little to do with the legal issues presented in the complaints.
This Article concludes that the movement to reform the McCarranFerguson Act is misplaced. Instead, Congress should prevent federal
courts from deciding any legal issue or question concerning the business
of insurance or the massive insurance industry. Presently, the Supreme
Court and federal appellate courts unwittingly exercise an inordinate
amount of control over the industry and are performing extremely poorly
in this role.37 This Article recommends that Congress create a federal
insurance agency and give that body the authority to regulate the business of insurance within and across state boundaries. Such an agency
would hear and resolve all substantive and procedural issues involving
insurance-related disputes, thereby effectively removing the need for federal courts' intervention.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b).
36. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
37. Courts are unwittingly exercising this control partly because the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as well as bills designed to reform or repeal the Act, contain many ambiguous
words and phrases. Often, state insurance commissioners, insurance consumers, and insurers ask federal courts to resolve such ambiguities. When federal courts resolve these ambiguities, they unwittingly exercise great power, and in so doing become extremely
ineffective regulators of the nation's insurance industry.
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AND
THE ACT'S ALLOCATION OF POWER AMONG STATES, THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, AND FEDERAL
COURTS

Many insurers viewed the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n 38 as an assault on states' authority to
regulate the business of insurance within state boundaries.39 Therefore,
Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act' to calm the anxieties of
local and national carriers.4 The Act allocates regulatory power to state
insurance commissions and, under some limited conditions, to the Federal
Trade Commission.4 2 But a careful examination also reveals that the Act
does not allocate any regulatory authority to federal courts. Yet, since
the Act's enactment, the Supreme Court as well as lower federal courts
have willingly or unwittingly accepted or seized opportunities to regulate
significant portions of the nation's insurance industry.4 3 The exercise of
such unwarranted judicial power has produced conflicting rules for both
national insurers and consumers."
The language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is less clear regarding two
other important matters. First, whether state insurance regulations and
enforcement proceedings must be merely adequate or genuinely effective, before intervention of some federal agency, is not easily discerni38. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
39. The Supreme Court noted that "in South Eastern Underwriters, [the Court] held
that an insurance company that conducted business across state lines was engaged in interstate commerce and thereby was subject to the antitrust laws. This result, naturally, was
widely perceived as a threat to state power to tax and regulate the insurance industry."
United States Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. 2202, 2207 (1993).
40. ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)).
41. The Supreme Court observed: "Obviously Congress' purpose [in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act] was broadly to give support to the existing and future state systems
for regulating and taxing the business of insurance." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408, 429 (1946); see also Fabe, 113 S. Ct. at 2207 (outlining the history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Spencer L. Kimball & Barbara P. Heaney, Emasculation of the McCarran-FergusonAct: A Study in Judicial Activism, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1-2. The authors
state:
Though McCarran has . . . remained free from legislative alteration, some

changes in the Act's allocation of power have resulted from judicial interpretation. In some recent decisions the United States Supreme Court has strikingly
altered the Act's meaning to an extent that might be thought of as "emasculation."..... The almost random selection of cases presented to and selected by the
Court contributes to the unevenness with which the Act has been interpreted and
the uncertainty that remains.
Id. (footnote omitted).
44. See infra notes 54-199 and accompanying text.
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ble. 45 This silence has generated some expected confusion among lower
federal courts. For example, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that only reasonable or
sufficient state regulatory schemes are required to avert federal control of
insurance activities. 46 Courts in the Second and District of Columbia Circuits, however, have suggested that they would require active and effective state regulation of the business of insurance before preventing
federal intervention.47
Second, the McCarran-Ferguson Act allocates power to the Federal
Trade Commission.4" But does the Act grant regulatory authority to
other federal agencies? Under the Act, such agencies are neither encouraged to regulate nor prevented from regulating national or regional
insurance companies. 49 Nevertheless, in recent years, the Departments of
45. See supra note 6. Section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act only states that
federal antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business in not regulatedby State Law." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added). As of this
writing, however, the Supreme Court has not defined the phrase "to the extent that." But
cf. Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-FergusonAct and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 81,100-101 (1983) ("The legislative history of the Act...
indicates that Congress intended [federal intervention] . . . only when [in]effective state
regulation exists. Otherwise, neither federal nor state law actually would regulate insurer
activity, leaving the public unprotected." (footnote omitted)).
46. See, e.g., Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1975)
(refusing to require established, supervised rate-making procedures); Ohio AFL-CIO v.
Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1182-84 (6th Cir. 1971) (requiring states to implement
sufficient regulatory mechanism), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972); Steinberg v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co., 486 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (requiring only the presence of a regulatory scheme within the state); California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (requiring the state to implement a
reasonably comprehensive regulation and enforcement scheme).
The court in Crawford stated:
That no rate bureau provisions have been made for title insurance (or for life or
health and accident insurance) does not.., mean that the provisions of the Trade
Practices Act are not applicable or that the Commissioner cannot enforce those
provisions against such companies. ...
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Alabama Insurance Trade Practices
Law is fully applicable and the McCarron [sic] Act exemption from the federal
antitrust laws is therefore activated.
Crawford, 518 F.2d at 220 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
47. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 316 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982); Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387,
390 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981), affd sub nom. Union Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); see
also Anderson, supra note 45, at 100 n.93.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "The Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
Law." Id. (citation omitted).
49. Cf 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
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Defense, Health & Human Services, Housing & Urban Development,
Justice, and Treasury adopted the position that the Act does not prevent
those federal agencies from regulating the insurance industry within and

across state boundaries.5 0 The Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission also embrace this

perspective. 5
From the viewpoint of these federal agencies, the insurance industry is
massive and the business of insurance overlaps and interacts with many of
the activities under the control of the federal government. Therefore, it is
only natural for federal agencies to monitor and regulate insurers' activi-

ties. Unfortunately, many lower courts support this position.5 2 Nevertheless, as argued more forcefully in Part VII, a policy permitting a

variety of federal agencies and commissions to regulate various parts of
the insurance industry only encourages the delivery of expensive insurance services to consumers.53
50. See Gordon v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 846 F.2d 272, 273 (4th Cir.) (holding that the government's claim under the federal priority statute could prevail over contrary state regulation of the business of insurance companies), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 954
(1988); Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419,421 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's regulatory schemes and plaintiff's claims under the Fair Housing Act and the
Civil Rights Acts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 431, 442 n.6 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that the Act does not prevent the Secretary of Health and Human Services from
issuing insurance (Medicare) regulations); United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d
428, 453 (9th Cir. 1981) (accepting the Department of Justice's right to prevent interlocking
directorates between competing banks and insurance companies and between bank holding companies and insurance companies), rev'd sub nom. BankAmerica Corp. v. United
States, 462 U.S. 122 (1983); Royal Standard Ins. Co. v. McNamara, 344 F.2d 240, 243 (8th
Cir. 1965) (adopting the Department of Defense's assertion that the Department's regulation of automobile liability insurance on military reservations does not violate the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Idaho ex reL Soward v. Internal Revenue Serv., 662 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.
Idaho 1987) (holding that the government's claim under the federal priority statute could
prevail over contrary state regulation of the business of insurance), rev'd, 858 F.2d 445 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989); McDiarmid v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.,
604 F. Supp. 105, 108 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not
bar the Department of Housing and Urban Development's regulatory schemes and plaintiff's claims under the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Acts); Abrams v. Heckler, 582
F. Supp. 1155, 1164 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the Act does not prevent the Secretary of Health and Human Services from issuing insurance (Medicare) regulations).
51. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 462-63 (1969) (acknowledging the
Securities and Exchange Commission's authority to restrain insurance companies from obtaining shareholder approval for a merger through the use of fraudulent misrepresentation); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1258-67 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (adopting
the EEOC's assertion of its authority to prevent a company from awarding insurance benefits in a sexually discriminatory manner), affd in part and rev'd in part, 727 F.2d 566 (6th
Cir. 1984).
52. See cases cited supra notes 47 and 50.
53. See infra part VII.
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INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS OVER THE DEFINITION OF BUSINESS OF
INSURANCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE SUPREME COURT'S

DECISION IN GROUP LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE

Co. V. ROYAL DRUG
Section 2(a) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act states that "[t]he business
of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the
laws of the several States."5 4 But what is the "business of insurance"?
The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not define or outline the scope of the
phrase, and the legislative history of the Act provides little meaningful
assistance. 5
Absent guidance from an express statutory definition, federal courts
have had to define the scope of the business of insurance. Unfortunately,
these definitions are often conflicting and confuse both insurers and insurance consumers. Although the Supreme Court has identified the relevant parameters encompassing the term, 6 lower federal courts continue
to disagree about two significant matters: 1) whether insurers' premiumrates or price-setting agreements are part of the business of insurance;
and 2) whether the activities of Blue Cross and Blue Shield companiesthe nation's largest providers of health insurance services-are truly the
business of insurance.
A.

Intercircuit Conflicts Over Whether Horizontal "Rate-Setting,"
"Premium-Rates," and "Price-Setting" Agreements Are Part of
the "Business of Insurance"

The Supreme Court decided United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n 57 in 1944, implicitly accepting in dictum, the view that premiumrates agreements are part of the business of insurance.5 8 Twenty-five
years after South-Eastern Underwriters the Court decided SEC v. Na54. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1988).
55. See National Securities, 393 U.S. at 458-459. The Court stated:
The legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act offers no real assistance.
Congress was mainly concerned with the relationship between insurance

ratemaking and the antitrust laws, and with the power of the States to tax insurance companies. The debates centered on these issues, and the Committee reports shed little light on the meaning of the words "business of insurance."
Id. (citation omitted).
56. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.

57. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
58. Id. at 562. "Few states go so far as to permit private insurance companies, without
state supervision, to agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates.... [I]t cannot be that any
companies have acquired a vested right to engage in such destructive business practices."
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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tional Securities, Inc.5 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall observed: "Certainly the fixing of rates is part of [the] business [of
insurance]; that is what South-Eastern Underwriters was all about."'
Nevertheless, the dicta appearing in these two decisions have not prevented federal courts from issuing conflicting horizontal 6 price-fixing
62
and rate-fixing rulings.
For example, nearly thirty-five years ago, the United States District

Court for the Northern District of California held that an agreement to
fix insurance agents' commissions is part of the business of insurance.6 3
More recently, a federal district court in the Third Circuit and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that agreements to fix
title insurance fees and automobile premiums are insurance-related business activities. 6' On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has held that actions involving premium rates are not part of the business of insurance.6 5

These conflicting rulings occurred before the Supreme Court clearly
identified the relevant criteria for determining whether an activity is part
59. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
60. Id. at 460.

61. See BARRY R. FURROW

ET AL., HEALTH LAW 787

(2d ed. 1991). Professor Furrow

explained that:
Courts generally view horizonal restraints, as compared to vertical restraints, as
more likely to violate [section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)]. Horizontal restraints are those among competitors at the same level of production or
distribution. Examples include an agreement among area hospitals to charge the
same per diem room prices (possibly, price-fixing) .... Vertical restraints involve
concerted action between competitors at different levels of production or distribution; for example, between buyers and sellers or manufacturers and retailers.
Id.
62. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
63. California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 179 F.
Supp. 65, 66 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (finding price-fixing conspiracies in the insurance industry
accomplished through boycott, coercion, or intimidation are not immune from antitrust
laws).
64. See Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (6th Cir. 1971)
(finding that the business of insurance includes the fixing of automobile insurance premiums by rating organization and its members), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972); Schwartz v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564, 572-75 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (finding that
a conspiracy among title insurance companies and their rate association to fix a title insurance sellers' charge is part of the business of insurance).
65. Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468,470 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 987 (1980). In Perry, an insurance company offered loans to finance insurance
premium payments. Id. at 469. The court ruled that the loan operation was not part of the
business of insurance. Id. at 470. In addition, the court observed that "business activities
of insurance companies not peculiar to the insurance industry are outside the scope of the
'business of insurance."' Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Royal Drug
Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375, 1386 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S.
205 (1979)).
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of the business of insurance.' The Court therefore arguably shares some
of the responsibility for intercircuit conflict on this issue. It would appear
that had the Court decided this matter early on, the division among the
circuits would not have occurred.
The facts, however, do not support this line of reasoning. Instead, evidence shows that even after the Supreme Court outlined the defining parameters of the phrase, courts of appeals have continued to disagree
about whether price-fixing or premium rate-setting agreements are part
of the business of insurance. In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Group
Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug.6 7 The Court in Royal Drug
stated in dictum that the core of the business of insurance includes: 1)
"the contract between the insurer and the insured";6 8 2) "'the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder'";69 and 3)
"the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation,
and enforcement., 70 Three years after Royal Drug, the Court set forth a
formal definition of the business of insurance in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno.71 Writing for the Pireno Court's majority, Justice
Brennan ruled that a practice is part of the business of insurance if: 1)
"the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's
risk";7 2 2) "the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured"; 73 and 3) "the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance industry., 74 Justice Brennan also stressed
75
that "[n]one of these criteria is necessarily determinative in itself."
Therefore, in light of the Pireno/Royal Drug criteria, the question
arises whether horizontal price-fixing or rate-making agreements are part
of the business of insurance. A careful review of post-Royal Drug and
Pireno decisions reveals a serious split among the federal circuits on this

66. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
67. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
68. Id. at 215.
69. Id. at 216 (quoting SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969)).
70. Id. at 215-16 (quoting National Securities, 393 U.S. at 460); see also FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560, 562-64 (1958) (accepting without holding on the issue
that the selling and advertising of policies is part of the business of insurance); Robertson
v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 449 (1946) (accepting the notion that the licensing of companies
and of their agents is within the scope of the business of insurance).

71. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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issue. The Third,76 Eighth," and District of Columbia78 Circuits hold
that price-fixing and rate-making agreements are part of the business of
insurance, while the Ninth Circuit holds they are not.7 9 It is obvious that
the Supreme Court must resolve the disagreement between the circuits.
An unstated policy that allows two national health-insurance carriers to
fix premiums jointly in the Second Circuit but not in the Ninth Circuit is
flawed and encourages unwarranted discrimination among purchasers of
health insurance. More important, where such price-fixing behavior is
condoned, increases in the cost of health insurance are less likely to be
constrained. 0
B.

Intercircuit Conflicts Over Whether Blue Cross and Blue Shield
CorporationsAre Engaged in the "Business of Insurance"

If one were to ask the typical policyholder to explain why she regularly
pays premiums to a Blue Cross and Blue Shield company, the consumer
would likely state that she is purchasing insurance from a health insurance company. From the perspective of millions of consumers, Blue
Cross and Blue Shield are insurance companies. 8' Furthermore, typical
health insurance purchasers accept a common notion that Blue Cross and
Blue Shield's activities are part of the business of insurance and those
activities often generate extremely large financial reserves in the form of
profits.82
76. Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218,225-26 (3d Cir.) (observing that
associations' rate-setting and risk-classification agreements are the business of insurance),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
77. In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552, 1556 (8th Cir.)
("Although a price fixing agreement may maximize profit, it is axiomatic that the fixing of
rates is central to transferring and spreading the insurance risk."), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
920, and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989).
78. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 321-25 (D.C. Cir.) (observing that an insurers' horizontal price-fixing agreements involving a joint reimbursement formula for insurance claims is part of the business of insurance), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 839 (1982).
79. United States v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau, Inc., 700 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that a horizontal agreement involving joint escrow services is not the business of
insurance), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1240 (1984).
80. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
81. "Blue Cross and Blue Shield is the largest insurance group in the nation, covering
approximately 80 million people .. " Spencer Rich, Blue Cross-Blue Shield Chief Adds
Private Plan to Health Care Debate, WASH. PosT, Sept. 20, 1991, at A9. This public sentiment on the role of Blue Cross and Blue Shield has been expressed on the floor of the
House of Representatives by one congresswoman who commended Blue Cross and Blue
Shield for the content of their "private insurance packages." 137 CONG. REc. H4648-03
(daily ed. June 19, 1991) (statement of Rep. Oakar).
82. See, e.g., Regional Earnings: Blue Cross Reports 37% Rise in Net Income, L.A.
TiMEs, Nov. 19, 1991, at C9 ("For the first nine months of 1991, Blue Cross's [California]
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Yet, thirty years after the establishment of the nation's Blue Shield and

Blue Cross companies, s3 federal courts cannot agree on whether these
companies are truly engaged in the business of insurance. This conflict
existed before the Supreme Court decided Royal Drug and Pireno and
the controversy remains even after the Supreme Court addressed the
business of insurance issue.
For instance, prior to Royal Drug and Pireno, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on two occasions that Blue Cross'
payment and charge agreements were part of the business of insurance.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed. In Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Insurance Co. ,as the
Fifth Circuit asserted that Blue Shield's agreements to reimburse pharma-

cies for patients' drugs were not directly related "to its status as a reliable
insurer.

86

net income soared 73%, to $122.5 million from $70.7 million a year earlier, and its ninemonth earned premiums rose 9%, to $1.74 billion from $1.59 billion.").
83. See Gary M. Smith, Comment, Provider Control of Health Insurers: Are Doctors
Still Calling the Shots? 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1079, 1086 (1990). Smith notes:
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans were first established in the 1930s by local
hospitals and medical societies, respectively, as means to finance health services
during the Depression. Although the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association
coordinates the Blue Cross/Blue Shield system, each plan operates independently
under the regulation of state insurance laws.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Another author describes the Blue Cross and Blue Shield history:
In 1932, the first Blue Cross plan was established in Sacramento, California. The
plan negotiated payment rates with participating hospitals, charged a single community-wide premium rate to subscribers, and guaranteed agreed-upon payments
to participating hospitals for the provision of selected services to subscribers.
... Blue Cross plans were incorporated under separate enabling legislation
with their own sets of rules and regulations (e.g., regarding rate-setting and Blue
Cross Board composition). In exchange for [s]tate tax-exempt status and relief
from reserve requirements, [s]tates generally charged the plans with the responsibility to serve the entire community and to provide insurance for low- and moderate-income persons.
In response to the expansion of commercial health insurance and to the lack of
coverage by Blue Cross of physician services, Blue Shield plans were established
....in 1939. Blue Shield plans reimbursed physicians, initially for the full cost of
each service, based on a negotiated payment schedule.
FURROW, supra note 61, at 534-35.
84. Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 554 F.2d 1253, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977) (adopting the
view that under the McCarran Act, the terms of Blue Cross' subscriber agreement were
"the business of insurance"); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1973
(holding that hospital payments and subscribers' notes arrangements are "part of the business of insurance").
85. 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
86. Id. at 1380. "It is beyond peradventure that every action taken by an insurance
company to enhance its status as a 'reliable insurer' does not necessarily constitute the
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Both intercircuit and intracircuit splits are found among post-Royal
Drug and Pireno cases. For example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit has stated unequivocally that determining whether
Blue Cross and Blue Shield is an insurance company is a waste of precious judicial resources. 8 7 It is enough to know that Blue Cross' "activities ... constitute 'the business of insurance."' 88 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has adopted a very similar position. 9
This notion, however, has not been accepted in the Second and Sixth
Circuits.' For example, in Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mutual,91 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, citing
Royal Drug, held that an agreement requiring Blue Cross to pay Dana
Corporation's medical claims was not part of the business of insurance.'
According to the court, the contractual agreement between Blue Cross
and Dana did not qualify as business of insurance, because the contract
did not satisfy the risk-underwriting prong of the Royal Drug test.93
'business of insurance."' Id. The Fifth Circuit found that Texas Blue Cross-Blue Shield's
"contractual agreements ... are somewhat related to the business of insurance. The relationship, however, is so attenuated that it must be subject to the antitrust laws."
87. Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 F.2d
1101, 1108 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990). The court noted that "[slince
Royal Drug, the focus of the McCarran-Ferguson inquiry has been the nature of the conduct alleged to violate the antitrust laws, not whether the defendant is a traditional insurance company." Id. (citation omitted). The court further observed that "contracts
between a Blue Cross plan and it subscribers have been found to be the 'business of insurance' within the meaning of the Act." Id.
88. Id. at 1108 n.7.
89. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Bell, 798 F.2d 1331, 1334 n.6, 1336 (10th Cir. 1986)
(citing Royal Drug and holding that "[tihe Kansas mandated-provider statutes constitute
the 'business of insurance' reserved to the states by the McCarran-Ferguson Act" and that
Blue Cross' activities are included under the law).
90. See, e.g., Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882 (6th Cir.
1990) (holding that Administrative Services Only contract was not within "business of insurance" for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Bernard B. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 528 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 679 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1982). The district court
in Bernard B. found that the provider agreements between Blue Cross and HHC, the local
hospital, did not qualify as the business of insurance when the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
enacted, and emphasized that "HHC points us to nothing since Royal Drug which alters
this picture." Id. at 131.
91. 900 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1990).
92. Id. at 888. The court held that "the ASO contract [between Blue Cross and Dana]
is not within the 'business of insurance' for the purposes of the Act." Id.
93. Id. The court observed:
The Supreme Court stated in Group Life and Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug
that "many aspects of insurance companies are regulated by state law, but are not
the 'business of insurance."' Similarly, in the instant case, Ohio has chosen to
regulate ASO contracts based upon a very different definition of the "business of
insurance" than that used by the Supreme Court. Clearly the ASO contract does
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Within the same circuit, federal courts of appeals have issued conflicting opinions regarding whether Blue Cross and Blue Shield's activities
are part of the business of insurance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example, has stated on two occasions that
Blue Shield's "provider agreements" are not the business of insurance. 94
The Fourth Circuit, however, also has stated that in Virginia, "Blue Cross
and Blue Shield are properly considered insurers under certain circumstances." 95 Therefore, the carrier's activities are part of the business of
insurance. 96

Similar inconsistencies appear among cases decided in the Eighth Circuit. In National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. Blue

Cross,97 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that Blue Cross contracts with hospitals were not part of the business of
insurance. 98 Nevertheless, eight years later, the same court stated in
Health Care Equalization Committee of the Iowa ChiropracticSociety v.
Iowa Medical Society & Blue Shield9 9 that such subscriber contracts "are

an integral part of the 'business of insurance' within the meaning of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act." 10
The Supreme Court shares much of the blame for these conflicting intercircuit and intracircuit decisions. On several occasions, the Court has
described the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies as private, healthnot meet the risk-transferring prong of the Court's definition of the business of
insurance.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. See Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1267 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Applying Pireno
and Royal Drug to the immediate case, the challenged activities [provider agreements]
clearly cannot be characterized as the 'business of insurance."'); Virginia Academy of
Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 483 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that Blue
Shield's "conduct is not the 'business of insurance"' and asserting that Blue Shield's "policy regarding payment of clinical psychologists is only tangential to that relationship in that
it does not affect the benefit conferred upon the subscriber"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916
(1981).
95. Anglin v. Blue Shield, 693 F.2d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 1982). The court held that activities of Blue Shield were protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act given that the plaintiff
failed to allege that Blue Shield's actions constituted a boycott. Id.
96. Id. at 321. "We thus conclude that the refusal of [Blue Shield of Virginia] to offer
the type of policy requested by the plaintiff is in the 'business of insurance' ..... " Id.
97. 479 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1979), affd, 628 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452
U.S. 378 (1981).
98. Id. at 1017-18.
99. 851 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1988).
100. Id. at 1028. The court observed: "The contracts between the Blues and their subscribers clearly have the effect of transferring or spreading a subscriber's risk. Subscribers
pay a fixed premium to the Blues, unrelated to the actual health care expenses which are
borne by the Blues. This is a classic insurance relationship." Id.
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insurance companies.1" 1 In other decisions, however, the Court characterized them as nonprofit service corporations."° The Supreme Court
has had good opportunity to decide conclusively whether the activities of

the nation's largest health insurance carrier are part of the business of
insurance. Regrettably, it has not. The Supreme Court must resolve this
controversy and accept what many already know: "'The differences between the practices of [Blue Cross and Blue Shield] and commercial in-

surers have diminished over time."1 0 3
IV.

INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS OVER THE

EXTENT

TO WHICH

FEDERAL ANTITRUST STATUTES SHOULD APPLY TO THE
"BusINESS OF INSURANCE"

While the McCarran-Ferguson Act states that the federal antitrust laws
compete with the state laws to regulate insurance,1°4 the Act also states
that the Sherman Act shall apply to all agreements involving boycotts,
101. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 817 (1986) ("One suit ...
brought on behalf of [Alabama Supreme Court Justice Embry] and as a representative of a
class of all other Alabama state employees insured under a group plan by Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Alabama ...alleged a willful and intentional plan to withhold payment on valid
claims."); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982) ("The principal
petitioner in Royal Drug was a Texas insurance company, Blue Shield .... ."); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 353 (1982) ("[Tlhe Blue Shield plan challenged in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co. indicate[s] that insurers
are capable not only of fixing maximum reimbursable prices but also of obtaining binding
agreements with providers guaranteeing the insured full reimbursement of a participating
provider's fee."); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 190 (1982) (noting that under the
Medicare Part B program, "the private carriers that performed these tasks in California ...
were Blue Shield of California," a "private insurance carrier[ ]"); Group Life & Health Ins.
Co. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205, 207 (1979) ("The respondents, 18 owners of independent
pharmacies in San Antonio, Tex., brought an antitrust action ... against the petitioners,
Group Life and Health Insurance Co., known as Blue Shield of Texas (Blue Shield), and
three pharmacies also doing business in San Antonio.").
102. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727 n.1 (1985)
("Group health insurance is provided either by commercial insurance companies or service
corporations such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield."); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
469 n.4 (1982) ("'Blue Shield Plans are not insurance companies, though they are, to a
degree, insurers.... [I]n a real and legal sense, the Blue Shield Plans are agents of their
member physicians."' (quoting Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield
of Virginia, 624 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1980) (alteration in original)); National Gerimedical
Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 380 (1981) (stating that Blue Cross
is "a nonprofit provider of individual and group health-care reimbursement plans"); accord
Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Blue Cross is not
an insurer in the classic sense of that term."), affid, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 860 (1977); see also Smith, supra note 83, at 1079 n.3 ("Blue Shield plans are
actually quantity purchasers of health care services rather than insurers.").
103. See 135 CONG. REc. E3615-01 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1989) (quoting Congressional
Research Service study).
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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coercion, or intimidation even if such agreements are regulated by the
states. °5 Federal courts have had great difficulty harmonizing this language with section 1 of the Sherman Act; consequently, inconsistent rulings and intercircuit conflicts are widespread." ° This section examines
the Sherman Act and the various rules that federal courts apply to determine whether insurers' activities violate the Sherman Act.
Next, this section discusses two different intercircuit conflicts. The first
analysis concerns whether various Blue Cross and Blue Shield agreements and combinations violate the Sherman Act.'0 7 The second concerns whether certain insurance-related activity constitutes a "boycott"
10 8
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
A.

A Brief Overview of the Sherman Act, the "Per Se Rule" of
Illegality, and the "Rule of Reason"

The Sherman Act-as well as other federal antitrust laws-is proconsumer. 1° The Act is designed to encourage businesses to deliver a variety of goods and services to consumers at competitive prices." 0 To help
achieve this end, section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.""'
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 122-46 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
806 (1945) (stressing that the purpose of the Sherman Act "was to protect consumers from
monopoly prices"); Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 387 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We add
that.., a further concern of this court is to promote the intended purpose of the Sherman
Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription."' (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 106 (1984)), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
110. Cf Central Florida Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 507 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
("Our antitrust laws similarly dictate that competition-and, thereby, consumers-are to
be protected rather than competitors."), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983); Satellite Fin.
Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 394 (D. Del.) (stating that "[a]ntitrust
laws restrict anticompetitive conduct in order to advance consumer welfare" and "are not
meant to redress personal wrongs that do not impact on competition or adversely affect
consumers. The primary purpose of the antitrust statutes, to benefit consumers through
competition, must guide the [c]ourt[s] in deciding antitrust issues before it."), modified, 643
F. Supp. 449 (D. Del. 1986).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV. 1992). Section 1 further states:
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
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While section 1 prohibits any combination and every agreement that
restrains trade, the Supreme Court has ruled that only "unreasonable restraints" are barred." 2 The Court has developed two rules to help determine whether business agreements, contracts, or combinations violate
section one of the Sherman Act-the per se rule of illegality and the rule
13
of reason.
The per se rule only applies to restrictive agreements that are "mani-

festly anticompetitive. ' ' 1

4

The Supreme Court has found many per

se violations where "combinations [were] formed for the purpose .. . of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce.""1 5 The Court also has stated
Id.
112. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)
(recognizing that the Court has historically prohibited only unreasonable restraints of
trade); NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (stating
that every contract is a restraint of free trade, but the Sherman Act prohibits only those
unreasonable restraints of trade); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 342-43 (1982) (stating that Congress did not intend a literal interpretation of "every"
restraint of trade and only unreasonable restraints of competition are unlawful); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87-88 (1911) (holding that only unreasonable contracts
restraining trade are prohibited, and that all other contracts are unaffected by the Sherman
Act).
113. See infra notes 114-21.
114. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977) ("Per se
rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive."); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) (holding
that "it has since often been decided and always assumed that uniform price-fixing by those
controlling in any substantial manner a trade or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman [Act], despite the reasonableness of the particular prices agreed
upon"). The Court has observed:
[Tihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of
per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned,
but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation ....
Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see also Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980) (per curiam) ("[Wihen a particular concerted
activity entails an obvious risk of anticompetitive impact with no apparent potentially redeeming value, the fact that a practice may turn out to be harmless in a particular set of
circumstances will not prevent its being declared unlawful per se.").
115. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); see also
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (finding
that those agreements that are clearly anticompetitive and have no redeeming value are
violations); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (finding that
anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is prohibited by the Sherman Act); United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (finding that horizontal restraints on trade
serve no purpose except to stifle competition, and are per se violations of the Sherman
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that the per se rule applies to both vertical and horizontal
116

arrangements.
The Supreme Court moved away from a rigid per se rule of illegality in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,117 in which the Court developed a rule

of reason analysis to condemn only undue and unreasonable restraints of

trade." 8 Standard Oil held that the rule of reason analysis was guided by
traditional common law factors: the power held by the monopoly to fix
prices and injure the public, the power to limit production, and the danger in deterioration in quality of a monopolized product." 9 Later decisions by the Court attempted to characterize the type of restraint to
balance the per se rule and the rule of reason.120 As a result of the historAct); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (finding combinations that
unreasonably restrain trade are unlawful); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,
263 (1963) (finding that vertical limitations of trade violate the Sherman Act where "they
have such a 'pernicious effect on competition and lack.., any redeeming virtue"' (quoting
Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (stating that agreements between
competitors to fix pricing in an effort to restrain trade violates the Sherman Act); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (finding that 82% of all
manufacturers and distributors of pottery fixtures agreed to fix prices and violated the
Sherman Act); Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 256 (3d
Cir. 1984) (holding that agreements to fix prices that are charged in transactions with third
parties violate the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).
116. See, e.g., Catalano,446 U.S. at 647-48 ("A horizontal agreement to fix prices is...
unlawful per se.... [A] horizontal agreement among competitors to use a specific method
of quoting prices may be unlawful."). But see Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1269
(4th Cir. 1983) ("It is well settled, however, that the per se characterization is not to be
applied as a talisman to every arrangement that involves a 'literal' fixing of prices. Many
lawful contracts, mergers, and partnerships fix prices.").
117. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
118. Id. at 63-64. The Court, after examining the Sherman Act, observed:
The merely generic enumeration which the statute makes of the acts to which it
refers and the absence of any definition of restraint of trade as used in the statute
leaves room for but one conclusion, which is, that it was expressly designed not to
unduly limit the application of the act by precise definition, but while clearly fixing a standard, that is, by defining the ulterior boundaries which could not be
transgressed with impunity, to leave it to be determined by the light of reason,
guided by the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce public policy
embodied in the statute, in every given case whether any particular act or contract
was within the contemplation of the statute.
Id.
119. 1d at 74-77.
120. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1979). The Court noted:
As generally used in the antitrust field, "price-fixing" is a shorthand way of
describing certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has
been held applicable. The Court of Appeals' literal approach does not alone establish that this particular practice is one of those types or that it is "plainly
anitcompetitive" and very likely without "redeeming virtue." Literalness is
overly simplistic and often overbroad. When two partners set the price of their
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ical development of the two rules, "[t]he practical difference between a
per se offense and a rule of reason offense is that under the per se rule,
anticompetitive impact of the alleged offense is presumed, while under
121
the rule of reason, its anticompetitive impact must be proven.
B.

Intercircuit Conflicts Over the Applicability of the "Per Se Rule"
and the "Rule of Reason" in Disputes Involving the Nation's
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies

As reported above, the Supreme Court, as well as several federal appellate courts, view the activities of Blue Cross and Blue Shield as part of
the business of insurance.1 22 In addition, the Blues-like for-profit
health and property insurers-cannot engage in concerted activities
which violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield cannot participate in unreasonable price-fixing agreements
and boycotts that restrict interstate and foreign commerce.' 2 3
A careful examination of federal appellate court decisions, however,
reveals that it is extremely difficult to ascertain whether Blue Cross and
Blue Shield's horizontal or vertical price-fixing agreements violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. The reason is quite simple: there is an inordinate amount of confusion over whether federal courts should perform a
per se or a rule of reason analysis in price-fixing cases.
The Third and Sixth Circuits, for example, have adopted the per se rule
to decide whether the Blues' provider (price-fixing) agreements violate
the Sherman Act.' 2 4 The Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, however,
goods or services they are literally "price-fixing," but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act.
Id.
121. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 684 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 890, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 904 (1983); see also Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989). The
Ninth Circuit stated in Hahn:
Per se violations are a limited class ...and it is much more common for courts
to analyze questionable activities under the rule of reason. The rule of reason
looks beyond the inherent anticompetitive potential of an activity and examines
its actual effect in practice. It imposes on the plaintiff the burden of establishing
that the practice in question unreasonably restrains competition.
Id.
122. See supra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
123. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 1013(b) (1988).
124. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 258-59
(3d Cir. 1984) (applying the per se rule and holding that Blue Shield's price-fixing agreements were neither unlawful vertical nor horizontal restraints), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016
(1985); Glen Eden Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 740 F.2d 423,431 (6th Cir.
1984) (remanding the vertical price-fixing case to the district court and ordering that the
court apply "a per se analysis").
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stress that allegedly unlawful price-fixing agreements must be analyzed
under the rule of reason. 125 It scarcely can be denied that the most egregious and poorly reasoned decisions involving price-fixing agreements are
found in other circuits. In particular, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
stated that the legality of Blue Cross and Blue Shield's price-fixing arrangements may be analyzed under either the per se rule or the rule of
reason.126 Finally, some complainants have accused Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of violating the Sherman Act's antiboycott provision. To resolve
the disputes, federal courts have employed both the rule of reason and
the per se rule'to determine whether antitrust violations occurred. 2 7 The
courts' efforts, however, have produced only an enlarged body of insurance law that is more inconsistent and less intelligible.
The Third and Sixth Circuits have held that a per se analysis must be
performed to assess whether Blue Cross and Blue Shield's concerted ac125. See, e.g., Brillhart v. Mutual Medical Ins., Inc., 768 F.2d 196, 199 & n.2 (7th Cir.
1985) (concluding that the vertical price-fixing agreement did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade under the rule of reason analysis and observing that "[tihis circuit has
held that provider agreements should be subjected to a rule of reason analysis rather than
a per se analysis under the antitrust laws"); Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1272
(4th Cir. 1983) (remanding the vertical price-fixing controversy to the district court and
ordering that the court "analyze the practices under the rule of reason"); Medical Arts
Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 675 F.2d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1982) ("We
agree with the courts and commentaries that have found that, like the price-fixing practice
upheld in BroadcastMusic, Inc., Blue Cross pharmacy agreements are novel restraints with
potential procompetitive effects, and therefore must be analyzed under the rule of
reason.").
126. See, e.g., Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 1988)
(reaffirming its position in Barry v. Blue Cross that Blue Cross' horizontal price-fixing
plans may be analyzed "under either a per se or a rule of reason analysis"), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 846 (1989); Barry v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866, 870-71 (9th Cir. 1986) ("We begin
our analysis by determining whether the participating physician [vertical] agreements fall
into a class of activity that has been condemned as per se unreasonable, or whether we
should instead analyze them under the rule of reason."); Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life &
Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433, 1436, 1438 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160
(1985). The court in Royal Drug stated:
Price fixing agreements have been held to be per se illegal. We find, however,
that the conduct challenged here falls outside those categories of activity classified as per se illegal price fixing.
The pharmacy agreements do not constitute a per se illegal combination ....
The plaintiffs have pled and tried this case as a per se case. They have not pled
any anticompetitive effect. Assuming without deciding, however, that the complaint can be read to state a claim under the rule of reason, we conclude that
summary judgment on a rule of reason claim was equally appropriate.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
127. See infra notes 128-31.
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tivities are illegal boycotts under the Sherman Act.128 On the other hand,
the Fifth Circuit has adopted the indefensible position that the rule of
reason should be used to resolve these types of controversies. 129 More
distressing, the Fourth Circuit has utilized both per se and rule of reason
analyses to decide whether Blue Cross and Blue Shield's refusals to deal
with competitors violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'30 In addition,
the Fourth Circuit continues to employ both rules, even though Congress
clearly directed that "boycotts" be regarded as per se illegal under the
Sherman and McCarran-Ferguson Acts.' 3 '
128. See, e.g., PennsylvaniaDental Ass'n., 745 F.2d at 259-60; (applying a per se analysis
to Blue Shield's price-fixing agreements); Glen Eden Hospital, 740 F.2d at 425, 430-31 (ordering the district court "to apply a per se analysis" when deciding the unlawful refusal to
deal (boycott) claim). The Third Circuit in Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n held:
To establish proof of an illegal boycott under § 1, a plaintiff must show "concerted action with 'a purpose either to exclude a person or group from the market, or to accomplish some other anti-competitive objective, or both."' In the
context of addressing appellants' per se price-fixing contention, we have already
demonstrated that Blue Shield's actions in setting the ... reimbursement fee and
entering into the provider agreements were purely unilateral.
... Thus ... appellants' boycott claims fail to establish a per se violation under

§ 1.
Id. (quoting Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 140 (3d Cir.
1984) (quoting DeFilippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 912 (1975))).
129. See, e.g., American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 267, 271 (S.D. Fla. 1972), (finding no impermissible boycott and observing that
"the 'rule of reason' . . . is the cornerstone of modem antitrust law"), affid, 486 F.2d 255
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
130. Compare Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1272 (4th Cir. 1983) (remanding
the case and ordering the district court to apply both a per se and a rule of reason analysis)
and Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 484-85 (4th
Cir. 1980) (holding that "[t]he 'boycott' characterization, however, avails us little in determining whether an agreement such as [Blue Shield's] is per se illegal .... [W]e are not
prepared to apply a per se rule of illegality to medical plans which refuse or condition
payments to competing or potentially competing providers"), cert denied, 450 U.S. 916
(1981) with Ballard v. Blue Shield, Inc., 543 F.2d 1075, 1078 (4th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430
U.S. 922 (1977). The Fourth Circuit in Ballard observed:
The complaint alleges that the defendants have combined and conspired to refuse insurance coverage... and to refuse permission for chiropractors to participate as officers in the companies offering Blue Shield Plans. Although the
complaint does not employ the term "boycott", we believe these allegations sufficiently charge a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act.
Id.
131. Even in the pace of the conflicting standards, the Fourth Circuit stated: "Congress
expressly provided that the Sherman Act should remain applicable to boycotts and agreement to boycott. The Sherman Act proscribes even peaceful, primary boycott designed to
dissuade persons from dealing with others. Consequently, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
condemns this type of boycott." Id. (citations omitted).
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C. Intercircuit Conflicts Over the Definition of "Boycott"-Before and
After the Supreme Court's Decision in St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Barry
The absence of a universal definition of "boycott" underlies much of
the conflict reported in the preceding section. Neither the Sherman Act
nor the McCarran-Ferguson Act defines the term.' 32 Several federal appellate courts have tried to fill the void by furnishing their own explanations. Unfortunately, this piecemeal process has produced many
unintelligible and incompatible definitions and rulings.
Before the Supreme Court decided St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. v. Barry, 33 the Fifth and Ninth Circuits defined the scope of "boy34
cott" very narrowly by insisting that only "blacklistings" were included.1
The Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits, however, adopted a more
liberal interpretation, holding that the definition also included concerted
35
refusals to deal and conspiracy.'
The Supreme Court in St. Paul tried to resolve the conflict by embracing a liberal interpretation of the term "boycott.' 136 It did not accept,
however, the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits' explanations. Instead, the Court gave an exceedingly broad, two-pronged definition of
"boycott": 1) "boycott refers to a method of pressuring a party with
132. There is, however, conflict among federal courts of appeals over whether the definition of "boycott" is identical under both acts. Compare In re Workers' Compensation
Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552,1561 (8th Cir.) ("The [St. Paul v. Barry] Court indicated
that for McCarran-Ferguson Act purposes, the terms boycott, coercion and intimidation
should be given meanings consistent with their traditional Sherman Act usage."), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920, and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989) and Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 232 (3d Cir.) ("We agree ... that in the St. Paul case the Supreme
Court held that the term 'boycott' as used in Section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
must be given the same breadth of definition and scope as under the Sherman Act."), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) with Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828, 833 (10th
Cir. 1979) ([The St. Paul Court] resolved the issue whether the boycott exception applied
to policyholders and insurers ....It did not, however, hold that the [McCarran-Ferguson]
§ 3(b) exception necessarily applied to 'all concerted activity violative of the Sherman Act
..... '"). See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966) (concluding that boycotts are generally characterized as per se offenses).
133. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
134. See Meicler v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the term boycott only applies to the blacklisting of insurance companies or agents
by other insurers or agents); Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 72829 (9th Cir. 1974) (restricting the scope of boycott to blacklisting among insurers and
agents), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
135. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(finding that conspiracies and an agreement to boycott are part of the definition of "boycott"), vacated, 440 U.S. 942 (1979); Ballard, 543 F.2d at 1078 (accepting the view that the
term "boycott" includes conspiracies and agreements to refuse insurance coverage).
136. St. Paul, 438 U.S. at 545.
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whom one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold,
patronage or services from the target";' 37 and 2) "'boycott' is not limited
to concerted activity against insurance companies or agents or... against
13 8
competitors of members of the boycotting group.'
The Court's unduly broad, two-tiered definition provides little guidance. Today, nearly fifteen years after St. Paul, the federal courts of
appeals remain profoundly confused about the meaning of "boycott."
More significantly, the confusion exists across as well as within the federal circuits. For example, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits embraced the rule that a concerted
refusal to deal is sufficient to establish a primary boycott. 1 39 But the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits have concluded that a "boycott" must include a
concerted refusal to deal or sell, plus either a conspiracy or coercion. 140
Extensive confusion also appears within some federal circuits. The
Third Circuit has adopted the position that concert of action, a total exclusion, and a conspiracy are necessary to prove an illegal boycott.' 4 '
137. Id.
138. Id. at 552.
139. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124, 1137 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting
that the term "group boycott" has broad application and "generally applies to conduct
involving a concerted refusal to deal, commonly defined as 'an agreement by two or more
persons not to de business with other individuals, or to do business with them only on
specified terms"' (quoting 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 10.27, at 155
(1980))), rev'd, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue
Cross, 624 F.2d 476, 484 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding a boycott where Blue Shield refused "to
pay for services rendered by clinical psychologists"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981);
Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185, 1191-92 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (holding that it is not "fatal to a boycott claim that plaintiffs have not alleged total exclusion
from the supply market for medical malpractice insurance" and that "[tlhe complain alleg[ing] a concerted refusal to deal, aimed at restraining competition with the ... market
for maternity services, . . . is sufficient under Section 3(b)'s boycott provision"), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 406 (1991).
140. See In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552, 1561 & n.14
(8th Cir.) (agreeing that "a refusal to deal except at a specified price, without more, is not
within the confines of the term boycott under the McCarran-Ferguson Act" and noting
that although federal courts differ over what constitutes an illegal boycott, "'[a]ll hold that
there must be a conspiracy causing irreparable damage to the business or property of the
complainant"' (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 437 (1911))),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920, and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989); Card v. National Life Ins.
Co., 603 F.2d 828, 834 (10th Cir. 1979) (failing to find a boycott and observing that for a
boycott "there must first be concerted activity by individual actors" and "a boycott, the
essence of which is the pressuring of a party with whom one has a dispute").
141. See Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 259-60 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985). The Court failed to find a "boycott" and
stated that "[t]o establish proof of an illegal boycott under [Sherman Act] § 1, a plaintiff
must show 'concerted action with "a purpose either to exclude a person or group from the
market.' ....
Id at 259-60 (quoting Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d
133, 140 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting DeFillipo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir.),
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However, this court also has stated that to establish a boycott, there only

must be concert of action; 142 a total exclusion or a conspiracy is not an
important element. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also has
issued inconsistent definitions of the term "boycott." In Klamath-Lake
PharmaceuticalAss'n v. Klamath Medical Service Bureau, 4 3 the Ninth

Circuit cited one prong of the definition in St. Paul and held that a boycott need only include concerted activity and a refusal to deal.' 4 However, in In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation,14 1 the Ninth Circuit cited
another part of St. Paul's boycott definition, and concluded that the defithird parties to
nition of "boycott" necessarily includes the enlistment of
146
an unlawful agreement, a refusal to deal, and coercion.
The Supreme Court's decision in St. Paul has spawned much of the
dissension in this body of insurance law. In addition, federal courts cannot harmonize key sections of the Sherman and McCarran-Ferguson
Acts. This morass will likely linger, but it does not have to continue.
Congress can exercise its authority and prohibit federal courts from regulating any part of the insurance industry or the business of insurance.

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975))). The Third Circuit also stated that the "claim must...
fail for lack of concerted action because there [was] no evidence that Blue Shield conspired
with any dentists." Id. at 260.
142. See Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 232 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981). In Owens, the Third Circuit did not find a boycott. The court stated:
"Assuming ... that the defendants participated in a rating bureau decision to boycott
Owens or engaged in some other concerted refusal to deal with him, such an agreement
would not be protected by the McCarran-Ferguson exemption. However, concert of action
remains a sine qua non in a boycott case." Id.
143. 701 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
144. Id. at 1287. The court failed to find a boycott on the facts and observed:
The [St. Paul] Court held that the boycott exception should take its broad Sherman Act meaning. Thus, boycotts were not merely limited "to concerted activity
against insurance companies or agents or, more generally, against competitors of
members of the boycotting group," but extended to refusals to deal with customers of some or all of those engaged in the boycott.
Id. (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 552 (1978)).
145. 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in partand rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
146. Id. at 929-30. The court found a boycott and quoted the St. Paul Court: "The
enlistment of third parties in an agreement not to trade, as a means of compelling capitulation by the boycotted group, long has been viewed as conduct supporting a finding of
unlawful boycott." St. Paul, 438 U.S. at 544-45 (quoted in Insurance Antitrust Litigation,
938'F.2d at 929). Also, the Ninth Circuit stated that in St. Paul,"the boycott at issue was
not made as a definition excluding... refusals to deal .... The evil of a boycott is not its
absolute character but the use of the economic power of a third party to force the boycott
victim to agree to the boycott beneficiary's terms." InsuranceAntitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d
at 930.
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INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS OVER WHETHER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT AND INSOLVENCY STATUTE PREEMPT
STATES' AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INSOLVENT
INSURANCE COMPANIES

Hundreds of insurance companies failed during the late 1980s, leaving
some of the nation's most prestigious health, life, property, and casualty
insurers as victims.' 47 More important, the insolvencies adversely affected thousands of innocent insurance consumers and creditors." Insolvent companies were also unable to pay millions of tax dollars to
federal, state, and local governments.' 4 9
Section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act clearly states that "[n]o
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance."' 5 0 Nevertheless, given the large increase in the number of
insolvencies, insurance commissioners, primary insurers, and reinsurers
have asked federal courts to decide whether federal insolvency and priority statutes override state schemes that regulate insolvent insurance companies.' l Federal courts of appeals have been characteristically divided
over whether key sections of the Federal Arbitration Act 152 and the fed147. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. .
148. See supra note 13. See generally Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 2.
149. See generally Darr, supra note 29, at 619-23 (noting that the taxing authorities' or
taxing entities' claims against insolvent insurers are often "postponed in favor of policybased claims").
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Darr,supra note 29, at 622-23. The commentator correctly observes:
Protection of consumer interests in priority statutes or by guaranty funds is not
unique to state insurance law, Congress and federal regulatory agencies are also
in substantial agreement with the choice to demote federal and state claims, especially when consumer interests are at stake....
...[S]tates have the obligation for liquidating an insolvent insurer. Congress,
in the federal bankruptcy law, has left that function to the states. In response to
that deference, states have adopted complicated schemes for the administration
of insurance company liquidations....
The limitation on state insolvency statutes arises because of the federal insolvency statute which provides for the priority of unsecured federal claims in insolvency proceedings not involving bankruptcy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
152. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988). Section 2 provides:
A written provision in ...a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or.an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
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eral priority statute 153 preempt section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
A.

Intercircuit Conflicts Involving the McCarran-Fergusonand the
FederalArbitration Acts

An insurance policy is a private contract between a policyholder and an
insurance company.' 5 4 Similarly, a "treaty of insurance" between a primary insurer and a reinsurer is an enforceable contract.' 55 These contracts may include an arbitration clause, which outlines alternative
Id. § 2.
153. 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (1988). The section provides in relevant part:
(a)(1) A claim of the United States Government shall be paid first when(A) a person indebted to the Government is insolvent and(i) the debtor without enough property to pay all debts makes a voluntary assignment of property;
(ii) property of the debtor, if absent, is attached; or
(iii) an act of bankruptcy is committed; or
(B) the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or administrator, is not enough to pay all debts of the debtor.
Id. § 3713(a)(1).
154. See, e.g., Standard Mot. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 868 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating
that "an insurance contract is a contract between the insurer and the insured"); Skirlick v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 852 F.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (characterizing an insurance
policy "as a contract between the insurer and insured"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989);
Stewart v. Morosa Bros. 'ftansp. Co., 611 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that "[a]n
insurance policy is a contract between insurer and insured"); Bush v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 448 A.2d 782, 784 (R.I. 1982) ("An insurance policy is a contract between insurer and
insured. It is essentially a contract of adhesion.").
155. See, e.g., In re Midland Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1186, 1188-89 (N.Y. 1992). The court
stated:
A reinsurance contract is one by which a reinsurer agrees to indemnify a primary insurer for losses it pays to its policyholders. Such contracts are of two
general types. Teaty reinsurance is obtained in advance of actual coverage and
may cover any risk the primary insurer covers. The contract is formed when the
primary insurer "cedes" part of the premiums for its policies and the losses on
those policies to the reinsurer. A facultative reinsurance contract is one obtained
to cover a particular risk. The reinsurer does not assume liability for losses paid
in either case; its only obligation is to indemnify the primary insurer....
Although reinsurancecontracts are indemnity contracts, they commonly contain
insolvency clauses which, even in the absence of a primary insurer's payment to
policyholders,permit a liquidatorto collect from the reinsurerthe amount of reinsuranceproceeds that would have become due if the ceding company had not become insolvent. The New York statutes encourage such clauses by providing that
unless the reinsurance contract contains an insolvency clause the primary insurer
may not consider the reinsurance as an asset or claim a deduction for the amount
ceded.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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procedures for resolving disputes.' 56 Furthermore, "the interpretation of
[insurance] contracts is ordinarily a question of state law."' 57 But insurance "contracts involve[ ] interstate commerce" and, therefore, the Federal Arbitration Act "governs contracts in interstate commerce.' 5 8
Federal appellate courts must determine whether state law or the Federal Arbitration Act governs when an insurance company becomes insolvent and a valid arbitration clause outlines the liquidation procedures.
Among the circuits considering this question, there has been an undue
amount of confusion. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits have concluded that section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude the application of the Federal
Arbitration Act.' 59 It also appears that the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit supports this point of view. The Fifth Circuit has held that
section 1012(b) does not bar the application of the Federal Arbitration

156. See generally ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE: MATERIALS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES AND REGULATORY ACTs 883-85 (1989).
157. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (stating that
section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act allows for arbitration to proceed in the manner in
which it is provided for in the contract or agreement between the parties).
158. Id. at 471-72.
159. See Bennett v. Liberty Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 969, 970-73 (9th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that Montana's insolvency statute does not regulate the business of insurance
and therefore does not preempt the application of the Federal Arbitration Act's policy
favoring arbitration in insolvency proceedings); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir, 1969) (stating that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not exempt the business of insurance from compliance with other federal statutes,
unless such compliance would prompt state law). The Second Circuit in Hamilton drew
from the language of the district court's opinion: "The plain and unambiguous statutory
language is persuasive evidence that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not intended to preclude the application of these federal statutes to insurance unless they invalidate, impair or
supersede applicable state legislation regulating the business of insurance." Hamilton Life
Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 291 F. Supp. 225,230 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, Hamilton Life, 408 F.2d at 606. The appellate court added that "[t]o avail itself of the McCarran
Act, then, appellant must show that the application of the Federal Arbitration Act would
'invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance."' Hamilton Life, 408 F.2d at 611 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)
(1988)). But see Washburn v. Corcoran, 643 F. Supp. 554, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court
in Washburn stated:
The Arbitration Act is an "Act of Congress" that does not "specifically relate[]
to the business of insurance." Article 74 is a "law enacted by [a] ... State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance." Enforcement of the Arbitration
Act to require arbitration where it is forbidden by Article 74 and would undermine the scheme of exclusive jurisdiction established by Article 74 ....
I conclude that Congress has determined that in such an instance the Arbitration Act
shall yield to the state law regulating the business of insurance.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).
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Act to the business of insurance even if a state statute regulates the insurer's activity." 6
Although the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue of whether an arbitration agreement between an
insolvent insurer and a reinsurer should be governed by state or federal
law, it has considered whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state
law in other contexts. In 1971, the court held in Hart v. Orion Insurance
Co.161 that section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar the
application of the Federal Arbitration Act where the arbitration dispute
involved a primary insurer and a policyholder. 62 TWenty years later,
however, the Tenth Circuit decided Mutual Reinsurance Bureau v. Great
Plains Mutual Insurance Co. ,163 a case involving a disagreement between
a primary insurer and a reinsurer. 1' The court held that Kansas law reg1 65
ulated both reinsurance agreements and primary insurance contracts.
Therefore, it concluded that section 1012(b) of "the McCarran-Ferguson
Act preclude[d] the application of the [Federal Arbitration Act] to the
166
reinsurance agreement.'
Despite the clear pronouncement of section 1012(b) of the McCarran-

Ferguson Act granting superiority to state statutes in regulating insurance, federal courts have continued to ignore the Act's language and held
that federal statutory law takes precedence. 67 In an attempt to harmonize the McCarran-Ferguson Act with the Federal Arbitration Act, several courts have concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act controls. 168
160. See, e.g., Miller v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1979)
("Based upon the clear meaning of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b), the district court correctly concluded that McCarran-Ferguson did not apply and that the Federal Arbitration Act made
the arbitration clause of the policy valid, enforceable, and irrevocable.").
161. 453 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1971).
162. Id. at 1360. In Hart, an airline pilot tried to recover insurance proceeds under an
occupational disability policy. Id. at 1359. There was disagreement about the validity and
relevance of the policy's arbitration clause given that the policy was negotiated and delivered in Montana, the insurer's place of business was in Illinois, and the suit was filed in
Colorado. Id. at 1360. Although the disability policy was a private, enforceable insurance
contract, the court observed that "[n]one of the provisions of the Montana, Illinois, and
Colorado statutes ... regulate[d] the business of insurance. Instead, they [were] laws of
general application pertaining to the method of handling contract dispute." Id. Under
these facts, the Federal Arbitration Act was applied and the arbitration provisions were
found enforceable. Id.
163. 969 F.2d 931 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 604 (1992).
164. Id. at 931-32.
165. Id. at 933.
166. Id. at 934.
167. See supra notes 47, 57-62 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
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Clearly, Congress must act to correct this problem, one which it failed to
anticipate when section 1012(b) was enacted.
B.

IntercircuitConflicts Involving the McCarran-FergusonAct and the
Federal PriorityStatute

Following the collapse of an insurance company, numerous claims
against the insolvent company must be satisfied. Often, consumers' and
creditors' claims form the bulk of the outstanding obligations. 6 9 To reassure these persons, many states have enacted statutes to govern the liquidation of insolvent insurers. 17 In fact, a majority of states have adopted
all or portions of the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act to help resolve
disputes and ensure that various claims are satisfied. 17 '

In recent years, a crucial debate has developed over whether taxing
authorities' claims against insolvent insurers are superior to the rights and
interests of policyholders and creditors. In particular, the federal government has filed several suits in federal courts, arguing that the federal priority statute supersedes any state insurance liquidation priority scheme
72
that gives preference to the claims of policyholders.
The wording of the federal priority statute is precise: "A claim of the
United States Government shall be paid first when a[n insurer] indebted
169. See generally Darr, supra note 29, at 619-23 (addressing consumer protection in
the wake of insurance insolvencies).
170. Id.
171. See UNIF. INSURERS LIQUIDATON Acr §§ 2-8 (1939), 13 U.L.A. 321,322-51 (1986
& Supp. 1993). Twenty-five states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, have adopted the
Act in whole or in part. ALA. CODE §§ 27-32-1 to -41 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.78.200.330 (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-611 to -648 (1990 & Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-68-101 to -132 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1064.1-.12
(West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5901(2)-(13), 5902, 5903, 5913-5920 (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN.§§ 631.011, .031, .041, .141-.201 (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-3301 to
-3360 (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/221.1-.13 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 304.33-010 to -440 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22:757-:763 (West 1978 & Supp. 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 132, 132A, 145-148,
150-52 (1991 & Supp. 1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §§ 180A-180L (West 1987 &
Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 375.950-.990 (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1993); NEV. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 696B.030-.180, 696B.280, 696B.290-.340 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17:30C-1 to -31 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-41-3 to
-23 (Michie 1992); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7408-7415 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1994); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 1901-1936 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 734.014.440 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-14-1 to -23 (1989 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 48.31.110-.180 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 33-10-1 to -39 (1992 &
Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 645.03, 645.81-.90 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 26-28-101 to -131 (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §§ 4007-4014 (1977 & Supp. 1990); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1261-1268 (1993).
172. See infra notes 174-99 and accompanying text.
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to the Government is insolvent."' 7 3 But the language of section 1012(b)
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is also clear: No congressional act shall
supersede any state law that regulates the business of insurance. Several
federal appellate courts have tried to harmonize these two arguably irreconcilable statutes. Their efforts, however, have produced strained, inconsistent, and less than intelligible rulings.
In Gordon v. United States Department of Treasury,7 4 the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland found that the federal
priority statute preempted Maryland's insurance liquidation priority statute.' 75 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
adopted the district court holding, 176 but the Fourth Circuit's reasoning
was exceptionally strained. The court reviewed the Supreme Court's
Pireno/RoyalDrug tests 177 and agreed with the district court's conclusion
that "liquidation of an insolvent insurance company and the determination of the priority of payment of claims against the insolvent [insurer] do
not constitute the 'business of insurance' within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 1 78 Therefore, under the federal priority statute,
the federal government could assert and satisfy its "superpriority" claim
circumventing Maryland's insurance liquidation priority statute without
179
violating section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has addressed the applicability of the federal priority statute as well. In Idaho ex rel. Soward v.
United States,180 the IRS challenged the district court's determination
that an Idaho insurance liquidation priority statute regulated the business
of insurance within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, claiming
that the state's priority statute superseded the priority rule under the federal priority statute.' 8'
173. 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
174. 668 F. Supp. 483 (D. Md. 1987).
175. Id. at 491. In Gordon, the Special Deputy State Insurance Commissioner of Maryland was appointed receiver for an insolvent insurance company. Id. at 485. The U.S.
Department of Treasury, citing the federal priority statute, asserted that federal claims
should be given superpriority under the federal statute. Id. The insurance commissioner
filed a complaint in the federal district court alleging that the federal government's assertion of top priority was illegal because it preempted the Maryland Insurance Code which
regulated the business of insurance. Id. Maryland's Insurance Commissioner sought a declaratory judgment that the Department of aTeasury's assertion of superpriority violated
section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id.
176. 846 F.2d 272, 273 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 954 (1988).
177. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
178. Gordon, 846 F.2d at 273.

179. Id.
180. 858 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989).
181. Id. at 446. The factual background is uncomplicated:
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The Ninth Circuit adopted a position similar to the Fourth Circuit's,

holding that the federal priority statute did preempt the state's insurance
insolvency statute.1 82 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, but did not apply, the Supreme Court's Pireno/Royal

Drug analyses to justify its holding.'3 Instead, the Ninth Circuit cited
the Supreme Court's business of insurance test outlined in SEC v. NationalSecurities, Inc.,"8 and concluded that an insolvent Idaho insurance
company was no longer in the business of insurance. 8 5 Therefore, it held
Pacific Insurance Administrators Agency, Inc., and Pacific Insurance Administrators, Inc., formerly engaged in the insurance business in Idaho. After encountering financial problems, the companies [became insolvent and surrendered their
assets to the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance] ....
During the liquidation process, the Internal Revenue Service ... submitted
claims for federal taxes, including penalties and interest .... Amended claims
stated that Pacific Insurance Administrators Agency, Inc., owed the United States
$25,514.20, and that Pacific Insurance Administrators, Inc. owed the United
States $88,482.26.
... Section 41-3342 of the Idaho Insurance Code establishes the priority of
distribution among claims against the estate of a liquidated insurer, setting forth
eight classes of claimants in descending order of priority. Class 5 of the priority
scheme includes claims of "the federal or any state or local government."
The United States disputed the priority assigned to its claims, asserting that it
was entitled to payment ahead of Class 4 claims under the Federal Insolvency
Statute.
Id. at 446-47 (citations and footnotes omitted).
182. Id. at 452.
183. Id. at 453-55.
184. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The National Securities Court observed:
The [McCarran-Ferguson Act] did not purport to make the States supreme in
regulating all the activities of insurance companies; its language refers not to the
persons or companies who are subject to state regulation, but to laws "regulating
the business of insurance." Insurance companies may do many things which are
subject to paramount federal regulation; only when they are engaged in the "business of insurance" does the statute apply ....
The relationship between insurer
and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation,
and enforcement ... [form] the core of the "business of insurance."
Id. at 459-60.
185. Soward, 858 F.2d at 452. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Application of the holding and reasoning of National Securities to this case leads
to the conclusion that Idaho Insurance Code § 41-3342 is not a law regulating the
business of insurance. To begin with, the statute deals with insurance companies
that no longer are in the business of insurance. The only "business" being conducted is the liquidation of a corporation which happens to have been an insurance company. Hence, the scope of the net cast by the statute is wholly unrelated
to the relationship between insurer and insured. The insurer has ceased to exist.
The only relationship is between the insureds and the government official charged
with overseeing the liquidation of the insolvents. Whereas the court in National
Securities found that in legislating the McCarran-Ferguson Act Congress focused
on the relationship between insurer and insured, the Idaho statute speaks to an
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that section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar the application of the federal priority statute in the insolvency proceedings.1 86
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the superpriority

question and reached an entirely different conclusion. In Fabe v. United
States Department of Treasury,'87 an Ohio court declared the insurance
company insolvent, ordered the company's liquidation, and appointed the
Ohio Superintendent of Insurance to serve as liquidator. 18 Federal
claims were filed in the state liquidation proceedings in which the Department of the Teasury cited the federal priority statute and argued that
federal claims should receive top priority."8 9 To resolve the conflict, the
superintendent of insurance commenced a declaratory action in a federal
district court, arguing that Ohio's insurance liquidation laws preempted
the application of the superpriority statute. 90 The district court disagreed, however, ruling in favor of the federal government.' 9 ' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and held that
Ohio's liquidation statute "protect[ed] the interests of the insured" and
entirely different concern in this context: the relationship between debtor and
creditor. The relationship regulated by [the Idaho statute] ... is between the
liquidated assets of corporations and the claims of various creditors.
Id. at 452 (citations omitted).
186. Id. at 455. One district court in the Tenth Circuit also reached a similar conclusion.
See Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Health & Casualty Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1297, 1299 (D. Colo.
1991). The court recognized that "Colorado . . . enacted an encompassing regulatory
scheme for the liquidation of insolvent insurance companies in [Colorado's] Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act." Id. The court stressed that "Colorado [did] not have a law...
establish[ing] ... the liquidation of insurance companies [as] the 'business of insurance."'
Id. Therefore, the district court held that "the relevant caselaw... dictates that the liquidation of an insolvent insurance company is not the 'business of insurance' as that term is
used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act." Id.
187. No. C-2-88-778, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17761 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 1990), rev'd, 939
F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 2202 (1993).
188. Id.
189. Id. at *1-2.
190. Id. at *4. The court noted that the Ohio Commissioner of Insurance "argue[d] that
to apply 31 U.S.C. § 3713 and give the claims of the United States first priority in this
instance would impair the laws of the state of Ohio enacted to govern the business of
insurance." Id.
191. Id. at *20. The district court stated:
[T]he United States Supreme Court appears to have adopted a somewhat limited
definition of the "business of insurance" as that term is used in section 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Under the Supreme Court's analysis the scope of the
term "business of insurance" is limited to those activities directly or indirectly
affecting the risk transfer indicative of the insured-insurer relationship.... [T]he
liquidation of insolvent insurance companies and the concomitant prioritization
of claims do not affect the transfer or spreading of risk. Accordingly, this court
concludes that Ohio Rev. Code § 3903.42 is not a state law regulating the "business of insurance" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
Id. at *19-20.
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"regulat[ed] the 'business of insurance.""'
protected from federal preemption. 93

Therefore, the statute was

When one considers that thousands of policyholders are adversely affected after health and property insurance carriers fail, the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits' conflicting holdings are truly disturbing. Both circuits
cited the Supreme Court's business of insurance explanations outlined in
Royal Drug and Pireno.194 The Fourth Circuit, however, ruled that policyholders' claims are inferior to federal claims because insolvent carriers
no longer engage in the business of insurance.1 95 Yet the Sixth Circuit
disagreed.1 96
The Sixth Circuit argued that the views of the federal government in
Fabe, which mirror those of the Fourth Circuit, "misunderstand the nature of an insolvent insurer. '"" The Sixth Circuit stressed that "[o]nce an

insurer is placed in receivership, only the sale of new policies is suspended during liquidation; the actual adjustment of claims and the payment of existing claims continue."' 9 Therefore, policyholders'
reasonable expectations and claims must be honored before satisfying the
claims of the federal government.' 9 9 Such intracircuit conflicts and quib192. Fabe v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 939 F.2d 341, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1991), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 2202 (1993).
193. Id. The court found the Ohio insurance liquidation priority scheme "to be a regulation of the 'business of insurance' within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
thus subject solely to the provisions of state law absent explicitly conflicting federal legislation." Id. at 343 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court partially supported the Sixth Circuit's holding in United States Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. 2202 (1993),
stating that "the Ohio priority statute, to the extent that it regulates policyholders, is a law
enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance." Id. at 2212. But the
Court truly exacerbated the conflict among the federal circuits and muddled this body of
insurance law when it held that "[t]o the extent that [Ohio's priority statute] is designed to
further the interests of other creditors.... it is not a law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance." Id.; see also Garcia v. Island Program Designer, Inc., 791 F.
Supp. 338, 342 (D.P.R. 1992) (adopting the Sixth Circuit's position in Fabe and holding that
the federal priority statute does not preempt Puerto Rico's insurance liquidation priority
statute), rev'd, 4 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1993).
194. Compare cases cited supra notes 76-79, 155 with Fabe, 939 F.2d at 348. The Fabe
court stated:
We cannot agree with the ... argument, that any regulation of insurance liquidation is per se not a regulation of the "business of insurance." Rather, we find the
better approach to be an independent assessment as to whether each facet of a
challenged plan regulates the "business of insurance" under the Pireno/ Royal
Drug! National Securities trilogy.
Id.
195. See supra notes 174-78.
196. See supra notes 187-93.
197. Fabe, 939 F.2d at 351.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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bling are excellent reasons for preventing federal courts from deciding all
insurance-related and business of insurance cases.
VI.

A

CASE STUDY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL

OUTCOMES IN FEDERAL COURTS AMONG CASES INVOLVING
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON

ACT,

ACT,

THE SHERMAN

AND OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES-

1941-1993
Federal courts play a prominent role in the area of insurance regulation. These tribunals, however, unwittingly discriminate against consumers, insurers and state insurance commissioners when deciding procedural
and substantive questions under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In particular, federal courts permit immaterial factors to influence the outcome of
McCarran-Ferguson cases where the following insurance-regulation questions are presented: whether the definition of business of insurance is
broad or narrow; whether the definition of boycott is broad or narrow;
and whether federal antitrust, arbitration, and insolvency laws preempt
state statutes that regulate the business of insurance.
Should extralegal factors-such as region of country, gender, ethnicity,
geographic origin, or types of federal circuits-singularly influence or determine the outcome of a legal action? Should such variables be relevant
if an action concerns a civil or a criminal matter, or if a case is decided
procedurally or on the merits? Moreover, if-after controlling for other
relevant variables or issues-one's religious affiliation or one's race determines the disposition of federal-court decisions, should it be cause for
concern? And, should we experience anger if-after controlling for all
other material factors-federal courts are significantly more likely to dismiss Asian-initiated rather than Hispanic-initiated suits on procedural
grounds?
The answer to each question is a reverberating "yes." Actually, under
either condition, outrage would be more appropriate because there is little, if any, relevant case law to support or to cause one to anticipate such
questionable outcomes. Yet several extralegal factors-those having no
purposeful connection with the merits of McCarran-Ferguson cases-are
systematically influencing the disposition of such cases in federal courts.
This section examines the astonishing results of an empirical examination of federal lawsuits involving the McCarran-Ferguson Act, federal antitrust laws and other federal statutes. The study concludes that the
likelihood of complainants-insurance consumers, state insurance commissioners, and insurers-winning on the merits or receiving a favorable
outcome on procedural grounds is shaped significantly by variables that
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have little to do with the legal questions and theories outlined in the
pleadings. The outcome instead is determined by factors over which litigants exercise little or no control. More important, such Supreme Court
and federal courts of appeals decisions have continued since the inception
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
A.

Source of Data, Sampling Procedures,and Demographic
Characteristicsof Litigants

Research activities involved finding, reading, and coding every reported McCarran-Ferguson case decided in federal courts and between
1941 and 1993. Using both WESTLAW and LEXIS computer research
systems, the investigation uncovered 175 Supreme Court and appellate
court decisions. 200 Each case involved the regulation of insurance and a
dispute over at least one or more of the following issues: the definition of
business of insurance, the definition of boycott, and the federal preemption of state insurance statutes.
For purposes explained below,20 1 an additional sample of 100 Federal
Trade Commission cases were randomly selected, analyzed and included
in the study. 2' These latter decisions also involved one or more of the
issues stated above. Therefore, the total sample population for this empirical study comprises 275 procedural and substantive rulings.2 ' 3
Table 1 illustrates some selected demographic characteristics of litigants. First, a comparison of appellate and Supreme Court cases reveals
a startling finding: complainants are more likely to lose in the court of
appeals, but are more likely to win in the Supreme Court. The percentages are 60.0% and 65.2%, respectively. This finding is rather perplexing
when we consider that no statistically significant difference exists between appellate and Supreme Court complainants and between Supreme
Court and appellate court defendants. A careful review of the percentages reported for each court supports this finding.
When viewing the types of procedural issues presented before the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, however, we uncover another
statistically significant result: Supreme Court litigants were significantly
more likely to complain about the federal preemption of state insurance
200. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, COURTS File (June 16, 1993); search of
WESTLAW, SCT and CTA databases (June 21, 1993).
201. See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
202. Search of LEXIS, Trade library, FTC file (July 2, 1993); Search of WESTLAW,
FATC-FTC database (June 21, 1993).
203. Willy E. Rice, Empirical Analysis of Judicial Outcomes in Federal Courts Among
Cases Involving the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Sherman Act, and Other Federal Statutes, 1941-1993 (1993) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 43:399

statutes, while court of appeals litigants were less likely to complain
about this type of federal preemption. The percentages are 34.8% and
11.2%, respectively.
In addition, among appellate court litigants, disability and health insurance contracts were significantly more likely to be involved in the legal
disputes. The percentages are 12.5% and 31.6%, respectively. But,
among the Supreme Court cases, life insurance contracts (30.4%) were
more likely to be the focus of the conflicts.
Table 1 also reveals that litigants who commenced their actions in the
court of appeals and in the Supreme Court resided in very different regions of the country. For example, appellate court suits were more likely
to originate in the East,2" Midwest,2 ' 5 and Southwest 2 -17.1%, 28.3%,
and 13.8% respectively. On the other hand, the actions filed in the
Supreme Court were more likely to commence in the West2°T-26.1%.
Nearly an equal number of appellate and Supreme Court cases started in
the South 20 8 -12.5% and 13.0%, respectively.
One hundred Federal Trade Commission cases also appear in the study.
Therefore, Table 1 illustrates some selected characteristics of these administrative actions that involve a combination of antitrust and insurancerelated (McCarran-Ferguson) issues. Among the findings, four are outstanding: 1) FTC lawyers (complainants), who represent insurance consumers' interests, were more likely to prevail (67.0%) in these cases; 2)
health insurance contracts and policies were associated with the overwhelming majority (64.0%) of FTC cases; and 3) the majority of actions
involved the scope of the "business of insurance"-63.0%.
Finally, a majority of both appellate and Supreme Court actions concerned antitrust issues and violations under the Sherman Act. The percentages are 44.7% and 30.4%, respectively. Among the federal courts of
appeals cases, however, a significantly higher percentage (20.4%) of suits
involving the Clayton Act appear.
204. The East includes the following jurisdictions: Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id.
205. The Midwest includes the following jurisdictions: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
206. The Southwest includes the following jurisdictions: Arkansas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas. Id.
207. The West includes the following jurisdictions: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
208. The South includes the following jurisdictions: Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id.
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B. The Disposition of McCarran-FergusonActions by Types of
Procedural (Regulatory) Questions and by Types of Insurance
Contracts
Table 2 presents the relationship between the types of procedural(regulatory) questions presented on appeal and the disposition of the actions.
First, it is important to note that these cases were decided in the federal
courts of appeals. Second, the reported Chi-square coefficient (7.8769) is
statistically significant at a probability level2 "9 of p=0.02.
Simply expressed, Table 2 reveals the following: complainants are significantly more likely to lose (77.5%) when the regulatory (procedural)
question concerns whether federal laws-the Sherman Act, the Federal
Arbitration Act, and the federal insolvency statute-preempt state insurance statutes and the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Also, complainants are
significantly more likely to lose (61.5%) when the procedural question
concerns whether the definition of boycott is broad or narrow. However,
appellants are likely to win and lose an equal number of suits (49.0%
versus 51.0%) when the regulatory question concerns the definition of
business of insurance.
Certainly, the findings reported in Table 2 are interesting and statistically meaningful, but viewed from a legal perspective, they are not astounding. Nothing material appears in the relevant caselaw to suggest
that complainants should win all, some, or none of these actions. However, the results reported in the next table are more disquieting from a
legal perspective.
What is so unique about disability-insurance contracts that would cause
federal courts to decide systematically in favor of or against the owners of
such contracts? Stated differently, do health-insurance policies include
some exceedingly uncommon terms and conditions that compel otherwise
impartial federal courts to issue unwarranted and disparate decisions? Of
course, the answer to each question is "no." A careful examination of
settled principles of contract law and of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
Federal Insolvency Statute, the Federal Arbitration Act, and the McCarran Act failed to uncover a single justification for attaching any legal significance to a particular type of insurance contract.
Yet, an equally cautious examination of the percentages reported in
Table 3 reveals that the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals are
209. With a legal audience in mind, the author has outlined previously an exceptionally
simple law-related illustration of a Chi-square computation, along with a brief explanation
of the "level of statistical significance." See Willy E. Rice, Judicial Enforcement of Fair
Housing Laws: An Analysis of Some Unexamined Problems that the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983 Would Eliminate, 27 How. LJ. 227, 253-55 nn.161-62 (1984).
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unwittingly permitting types of insurance contracts to influence their
decisions.
Table 3 illustrates the statistically significant relationship between the
disposition of cases and types of insurance contracts. These findings appear only among those cases where the "business of insurance" and "federal preemption" questions were presented. The results are compelling:
complainants were more likely to win in federal court if the regulatory
disputes involved health- and disability-insurance contracts; the percentages are 55.0% and 66.7%, respectively. Conversely, complainants were
significantly more likely to lose if the "business of insurance" or "preemption" questions concerned life-insurance and other types of insurance
contracts-80.0% and 76.9%, respectively.
Of course, if the evidence in Table 3 does not establish conclusively
that federal courts are permitting unwarranted, extralegal factors to influence insurance-related regulatory actions, perhaps the findings reported
in Tables 4 and 5 are more convincing.
Table 4 shows the relationship between region of the country-complainants' residences or places of business-and the disposition of McCarran-Ferguson actions. Only federal appellate-court cases are
represented in Table 4. The effects of region of country on the disposition of claims, however, are measured at two time periods: 1) before the
Supreme Court's business of insurance decision in Royal Drug;2 10 and 2)
after the Court decided Royal Drug.
Among the cases decided after Royal Drug, the findings indicate that
no statistically significant association between region of country and outcome materialized: complainants from the Midwest, West, and other regions of the country were likely to win or lose an equal number of
McCarran-Ferguson actions in the courts of appeals.
Among the suits resolved before Royal Drug, however, the findings are
quite different. First, complainants from the western region of the country were significantly more likely to win (71.4%) in the federal appellate
courts. But complainants who resided in other regions of the nationbarring the Midwest-were significantly more likely to lose (78.9%) McCarran-Ferguson disputes in federal courts.
The pattern of the findings appearing in Table 5 is similar to that portrayed in the preceding table. Table 5, however, illustrates the association
between types of complainants-insured individuals, insured businesses,
and reinsurers-the disposition of McCarran-Ferguson conflicts. Here,
the effects of types of complainants on the outcome of regulatory dis210. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); see also
supra notes 67-70, 76-93 and accompanying text.
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putes in the courts of appeals are assessed at two intervals: 1) before the
Supreme Court presented its definition of boycott decision in St. Paul;21
and 2) after the Court decided St. Paul.
Among the cases decided after St. Paul, the reported likelihood ratio21 2
(2.074) is not statistically significant. This simply means that the courts of
appeals did not permit a complainant's legal status to influence whether
that person was successful or unsuccessful on appeal. Among the actions
decided before St. Paul, however, the likelihood ratio (3.5548) is statistically significant at p=0.05. The interpretation is clear: where the regulatory question concerned the definition of boycott, individual
policyholders were significantly more likely to win in the courts of appeals. Conversely, other types of complainants were significantly more
likely to lose. The reported percentages are 75.0% and 83.3%,
respectively.
Tables 4 and 5 both clearly show that federal courts of appeals are less
likely to allow impermissible variables to influence their business of insurance and boycott decisions after the Supreme Court resolved the intercircuit conflicts in Royal Drug and in St. Paul. Undeniably, these two
findings are extremely encouraging.
Nevertheless, as outlined in Parts II, III and IV, there are many other
intra and intercircuit conflicts that the Supreme Court has not settled.
Arguably, many of those disagreements and inconsistencies have developed and will continue to develop because federal judges permit extralegal factors to influence the manner in which business of insurance and
other regulatory questions are decided in the federal courts of appeals.
C. A Multivariate Probit Two-Stage Analysis of the Disposition of
McCarran-FergusonCases in Federal Courts, 1946-1993
Are federal courts truly biased against complainants whose claims involve life-insurance contracts and less sympathetic toward those whose
actions concern health-insurance contracts? Are federal appellate courts
biased in favor of complainants from the West and against those from
other regions of the country? Or, are state insurance commissioners
more likely to win in federal court than insurance consumers?
211. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978); see also supra notes
135-46 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS FOR TIHE SOCIAL SCIENCES 736-40 (2d ed.
1973) (discussing likelihood ratio tests for categorical data). The likelihood ratio test and
the Chi-squared test are very similar. Also, the latter test is extremely easy to compute and
understand. However, the likelihood ration test should be applied where the sample size is
fairly small and the observed number of cases in a table cell is five or less. Id. A review of
Table 5 shows that these conditions are present.
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Apparently, the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals are
biased and are intentionally or unintentionally permitting extralegal factors to influence the outcome of McCarran-Ferguson actions. This certainly is a reasonable conclusion based on the statistical evidence
appearing in Tables 3-5.
Yet conceivably, a less obvious statistical aberration could be producing what appears to be judicial bias. Or perhaps the presumably significant extralegal variables may be masking the influence of an even more
obscure, significant legal factor-one that has not been measured and assessed in this study. Stated another way, some other underlying, material
legal factor-which is highly correlated with these impermissible variables-may be generating what appears to be unusual statistical findings.
For example, Table 2 presents the statistically significant relationship
between the disposition of claims and types of procedural questions
presented on appeal. The results show that complainants are likely to win
or lose, depending on the type of question raised. Therefore, a series of
important statistical questions must be answered: which are the "true"
predictors of judicial outcomes in federal courts? Are the significant extralegal variables reported in Tables 3-5 more important? Or is the legal
variable-types of procedural questions-more relevant? A definitive
answer cannot be presented unless we perform an additional analysis.
Also, a phenomenon called "self-selectivity bias ' '213 may be causing
what appears to be judicial bias. Such bias often arises in samples because of the differences between those who decide to commence insurance-related antitrust actions and those who decide not to initiate such
actions. Expressed differently, an otherwise fairly random sample of McCarran-Ferguson decisions may be comprised primarily of aggrieved
complainants who decided to file suits in federal district courts and who
decided to appeal adverse district-court rulings to a federal court of appeals or to the Supreme Court.
213. See, e.g., G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN
ECONOMETRIcS 257-71 (Econometric Society Monograph No. 3, 1983). For examples of
and tests for self-selectivity bias from a legal perspective, see Willy E. Rice, JudicialBias,
the Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection:An Empirical Analysis of State Supreme
Courts' Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covehant-of-Good-Faith and ExcessJudgment Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 371-75 (1992) [hereinafter Rice,
Judicial Bias]; Will E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Individual Rights
Under the National Labor Relations Act and Under the Labor-ManagementRelations Act
Between 1935 and 1990-An Historicaland EmpiricalAnalysis of Unsettled Intercircuitand
Intracircuit Conflicts, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 653, 730-34 (1991) [hereinafter Rice, Enforcement of Individual Rights]; Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title
VI, Title IX and Section 504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis, 5 REV. LrrIG. 219, 27982 (1986) [hereinafter Rice, Grove City Analysis].

1994]

Regulation of the Insurance Industry

Furthermore, self-selection bias might appear in another form.21 4
Complainants who received favorable outcomes in the district courts and
who decided not to appeal their actions to a federal court of appeals
would not appear in a sample. Those successful litigants therefore would
have removed themselves from the original pool of complainants. Under
either situation, an otherwise fairly random sample of McCarran-Ferguson cases would be extremely biased. Under such conditions, it would be
highly improper to conclude that judicial bias is producing the unwarranted discrimination among complainants. A "selectivity bias" test is
thus necessary to determine whether the sample population is fairly representative of the various types of appellants.
Table 6 displays the findings of a multivariate probit two-stage analysis.215 This statistical procedure answers two important questions: (1)
whether a statistically significant amount of self-selectivity bias appears in
the sample; and (2) whether the concurrent and multiple impacts of both
extralegal and legal factors-on the disposition of McCarran-Ferguson
actions-are statistically meaningful, if selectivity bias is absent.
Before addressing these questions, some initial remarks are warranted.
First, several predictor variables appear in the extreme left column in Table 6. A few of these statistically significant predictors were discussed
earlier and are illustrated in Tables 2 and 5. We evaluate these predictors
at this point to evaluate their simultaneous effects on the disposition of
insurance-related, regulatory actions. Second, 275 complainants appear
in the sample: 100 Federal Trade Commission (administrative) cases and
175 cases that were commenced in a federal district court. This latter
group of litigants decided to obtain additional judicial review in either a
federal court of appeals or the Supreme Court. The Federal Trade Commission, however, reviewed and resolved the 100 administrative actions
involving the McCarran-Ferguson Act, but none of those administrative
cases were appealed. The FTC complainants decided not to go to a fed-

214. See Rice, Enforcement of Individual Rights, supra note 213, at 733.
Additionally, the difference between litigants' financial resources is often another source of selectivity bias because a positive relationship exits [sic] between
the level of one's financial resources and one's ability to purchase good legal representation. Therefore, a finding that [complainants are more or less likely to win
in state supreme courts] could be a reflection of differential access to adequate
resources rather than a reflection of judicial bias.
Id.
215. See Appendix, Table 6; see also Rice, Grove City Analysis, supra note 213, at 28687; Rice, Enforcement of Individual Rights, supra note 213, at 733 & n.491.
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eral court for further review, therefore, they do not appear among either
the appellate court or the Supreme Court cases.2 16
The multivariate probit coefficients appearing in the "decision-to-initiate" column answer a relevant methodological question: Do any of the
selected predictors explain who is more likely to initiate an insurancerelated action in federal court? The answer is "yes." There are some
meaningful differences between those who decided to pursue their causes
in a federal court and those who did not. First, the statistically significant
negative -2.5376 coefficient suggests that complainants are less likely to
initiate a federal suit, if the regulatory question concerns the preemption
of federal antitrust laws. Also, the statistically meaningful negative 1.2525 coefficient implies that aggrievants are less likely to initiate an action in a district court, if the regulatory conflict involves the preemption
of state insurance laws.
Do these two significant predictors influence the disposition of cases in
federal courts? An examination of the lambda terms under the two "Disposition of McCarran-FergusonClaims" columns in Table 6 suggests that
they do not. First, the statistically insignificant lambda terms-2.3476 and
2.9574-indicate that self-selectivity bias is absent from the sample. The
lambda coefficients also mean that judicial outcomes are less likely to be
influenced by some distinctive attributes of complainants who decided to
seek appellate review in the federal courts.
Consider the three statistically significant probit coefficients illustrated
under the heading, "Disposition of McCarran-FergusonClaims in Federal
Courts of Appeals." They are easily interpreted: 1) The 2.8711 probit coefficient means that state insurance commissioners were significantly
more likely to win in the courts of appeals than any other type of complainant; 2) The 1.7222 probit term indicates that complainants were significantly more likely to win in the courts of appeals if their procedural
question concerned the scope of the boycott definition; and 3) complainants were significantly more likely to win in the appellate courts if they
commenced any type of McCarran-related action in a federal court
before the Supreme Court decided Royal Drug. The corresponding
probit coefficient is 1.7317.
Although the boycott finding is intellectually interesting, it certainly is
not spectacular from a legal perspective. In short, there is no compelling
reason for complainants' winning either all, a few, or any actions involv216. The Federal Trade Commission also appeared as complainant and defendant in a
few of the federal court cases. There was, however, no overlap between FTC administrative cases and federal court cases in which the Federal Trade Commission appealed as a
litigant. See Appendix, Table 1.
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ing the definition of boycott. Also, there is little cause for alarm upon
learning that federal appellate courts were significantly more likely to
rule in favor of complainants, especially when plaintiffs were state insurance commissioners. In fact, this finding is quite compatible with what
we know or would expect. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, state legislatures may enact a variety of insurance-related statutes and allow insurance commissioners to exercise a considerable amount of authority
under such statutes.2 17 Similarly, federal courts are less likely to question
state insurance commissioners' statutory interpretations or regulatory activities unless the commissioners abuse their powers.
Additionally, complainants were more likely to win in the appellate
courts if their actions were decided before Royal Drug and were less
likely to win if their causes were resolved after Royal Drug.21 8 This finding clearly illustrates the influence of Supreme Court decisions on the
disposition of cases in the lower federal courts. More important, the disclosure is disturbing because the disposition of insurance-related disputes
in the court of appeals should not depend on the timing of unrelated or
peripheral Supreme Court decisions. We must remember that the primary question in Royal Drug was whether the definition of business of
insurance was broad or narrow. 219 Yet, Royal Drug influenced whether
complainants won or lost any type of controversy before or after Royal
Drug was decided. Clearly, this type of phenomenon should not be occurring in the federal courts of appeals.
Finally, the two columns which appear at the far right in Table 6 also
support the proposition that federal courts unwittingly or intentionally
permit unwarranted and impermissible factors to influence the outcome
of insurance-related disputes. Here, only one statistically significant factor appears; and note that the test for self-selectivity bias is insignificant.
The statistically significant 3.7100 coefficient reconfirms an earlier discovery: state insurance commissioners were significantly more likely to win
than any other type of complainant. Unlike the previous finding, however, this statistic is particularly vexatious because it appears only among
complainants who filed their complaints in midwestern states. Once
more, the following point must be underscored: Neither the McCarranFerguson Act, the Sherman Act, the Federal Arbitration Act, nor the federal insolvency statute supports or causes one to expect such an improbable outcome in the federal courts.
217. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
218. See Appendix, Table 4.
219. See supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

In light of the legal analysis and empirical findings reported in this paper, the movement to reform the McCarran-Ferguson Act is clearly misplaced. Instead, federal courts should be prevented from deciding any
question or controversy involving the business of insurance or the insurance industry in general. The Supreme Court and the federal courts of
appeals exercise a considerable amount of control over the massive insurance industry. Yet, these courts simply are not performing as well as they
should.
Federal courts continue to allow immaterial factors that have little to
do with regulatory or with business-of-insurance questions to influence
the outcome of litigation. Congress did not expect federal courts to play
such an important role because the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not explicitly allocate any regulatory authority to the federal courts of appeals
or to the Supreme Court. Moreover, Congress certainly did not intend
for federal courts to consider extralegal variables when deciding an insurance-related issue involving the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Sherman
Act, the Federal Insolvency Statute, and the Federal Arbitration Act.
In recent years, several members of the United States Senate and
House of Representatives have introduced bills that would address some
of the problems outlined in this Article.2 2 Specifically, S. 719, the proposed Insurance Competition Improvement Act of 1989, would have created a federal insurance-regulatory commission to draft universal
regulations,2 2 ' and H.R. 1257, the proposed Federal Insurance Administration Act, would establish a federal insurance commission.2 22 The commission would be an independent executive agency, whose mission would
220. See H.R. 1257, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (seeking primarily to reconstitute the
Federal Insurance Administration as an independent executive-branch agency); S. 719,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (proposing limitation of the antitrust exemption for insurance
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act); H.R. 1093, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (proposing
the prohibition of insurers' practices of sharing information on premium rates, conditioning the sale of insurance on the purchase of another product or impairing the availability or
affordability of insurance); see also supra note 28.
221. See S. 719; see also S. 1644, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (establishing an insurance
regulatory commission to conduct investigations, assess insurers and reinsurers to pay the
commission's expenses, certify state insurance departments, and examine interstate insurers); Anne Saker, Momentum Grows for FederalRegulation, USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 1991, at
10B ("Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, D-Ohio, has introduced a bill [S. 1644] that would create
an insurance-regulatory commission to draft standard regulations and would lift the antitrust exemption. States would be required to enact the standards and retain hands-on
oversight of companies.").
222. H.R. 1257.
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be to "improve[ ] the safety and fairness of [the] insurance system. '223 S.
719 was never enacted by the Senate, and as of this writing, H.R. 1257 has
not been enacted.
To help correct the judicially created problems described in this Article, Congress should create a federal department of insurance and give
that body the authority to regulate the business of insurance within and
across state boundaries. The proposed department would not necessarily
set premium rates, design universal insurance forms, or oversee the daily
activities of insurance companies within the respective states. The
agency, however, should be given the authority to establish several regional offices and to hear and resolve all insurance-related conflicts involving the insurance industry and consumers.
As two commentators have observed, "[i]nsurance transactions and institutions are often subject to judicial scrutiny" and those decisions frequently and significantly affect "the character of insurance transactions
and institutions. 2 24 Moreover, the effects of judicial decisions have
"sometimes been considerably more significant than the enforcement of
regulatory measures by the commissioner of insurance., 225 Judicial decisions, however, are "relatively imprecise" and "provide little guidance"22 6
for both consumers and insurers who want to resolve substantive and procedural conflicts in a timely and fair manner.
Until Congress recognizes the severity of this problem and implements
corrective measures, federal courts will continue to issue conflicting and
poorly reasoned insurance-related decisions. Meanwhile, insurance consumers, insurers, and the insurance industry will remain the victims of
such judicial rulings.

223. See 139 CONG. REC. E580 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1993) (statement of Rep. Joseph P.
Kennedy, II). The bill establishes standards by which the agency would certify direct insurers, H.R. 1257 § 203, and reinsurers. Id. § 204.
224. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 30, § 8.1(c), at 938.
225. Id.
226. Id. § 8.3(2), at 943 n.1.
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APPENDIX

SOME SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF

ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS SURROUNDING THE

ACT, 1946-1993 (N=275)

MCCARRAN-FERGUSON
Selected Demographic
Characteristics
Disposition of Cases from
Complainants' Perspective
• Favorable
* Unfavorable
"13pes of Complainants:
* Insured Individuals
* Insured Corporations
Health-Care Providers
• Insurers
* State Insurance Commissioners
* Federal Trade Commission
I' pes of Defendants:
* Health-Care Providers
" Insurers
" Federal Trade Commissioner &
Justice Department
" State Insurance Commissioners
Procedural Issues Involving The
McCarran-Ferguson Act:
" Preemption & Other Federal
Statutes
* Preemption & Various State
Laws* Scope-"Business of Insurance"
* Scope-"Boycott"
"ypes of Insurance Contracts:
* Automobile
" Disability" Health
" Life
" Other
Region of Country:
" East
" Midwest
" South
" Southwest
" West
Federal Circuits
" Second
" Fifth
" Seventh
* Eighth
Ninth
* District of Columbia
Applicability of Selected Federal
Statutes
* Clayton Act
* Sherman Act
* ERISA
* Federal Trade Act

Federal Trade
Commission Decisions
(N=100)

Federal Appellate
Court Decisions
(N=152)

U.S. Supreme
Court Decisions
(N=23)

Percent

Percent

Percent

40.0
60.0**

65.2**
34.8

100.0

32.2
19.1
9.2
22.4
7.9
-

30.4
17.4

49.0
51.0

11.2
50.0

8.7
56,5

-

11.8
21.7

8.7
17.4

46.1

39.1

11.2***
69.7
17.1

34.8****
78.3
8.7

64.0**
8.0
24.0

10.5
12.5*
31.6*
13.2**
32.2

4.3
30.4*
30.4**
34.9

28.0
27.0
11.0
14.0
11.0

17.1
28.3*
12.5
13.8
16.4

8.7
8.7*
13.0
8.7
26.1

19.0
12.0
16.0
9.0
10.0
-

8.6
19.1
9.9
11.2
13.8
5.9****

8.7
8.7
4.3
4.3
17.4 •
26.1 **

20.4*
44.7
14.5
3.4

4.3*
30.4
4.3
1.7

67.0
33.0

-

63.0
31.0
4.0

8.0
5.0
100.0

Levels of Statistical Significance for Phi Coefficients in a 2 x 2 table:
**** p < .001
***p < .01
** p < .02
* p < .05

-

17.4
13.0
-
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TABLE

2.

DISPOSITION OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACTIONS BY

VARIOUS TYPES OF PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, AMONG CASES
DECIDED IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,

1946-1993 (N=152)

"Primary" Procedural Questions Before the Courts

Disposition of Claims

Whether Federal Antitrust
Arbitration, Insolvency &
Various Other Laws Preempt
State Insurance Laws &
McCarran-Ferguson Act

Whether the
Definition of
"Business of
Insurance"
is Restrictive

Whether the
Definition of
"Boycott" is
Broad or
Narrow

Favorable Outcomes
for Complaints

9
(22.5)

42
(49.0)

10
(38.5)

Unfavorable Outcomes
for Complainants

31
(77.5)

44
(51.0)

16
(61.5)

TOTAL

40
(100.0)

86
(100.0)

26
(100.0)

Chi square=7.8769; df=2
Level of statistical significance: p = 0.02
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DISPOSITION OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACTIONS BY TYPES

OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS, AMONG CASES INVOLVING BOTH
"BUSINESS OF INSURANCE" AND "PREEMPTION"

ISSUES,

1946-1993 (N=79)
Types of Insurance Contracts
Health
Insurance

Life
Insurance

Disability
Insurance

Other Types
of Insurance

Favorable Outcomes
for Complainants

22
(55.0)

2
(20.0)

2
(66.7)

6
(23.1)

Unfavorable Outcomes
for Complaints

18
(45.0)

8
(80.0)

1
(33.3)

20
(76.9)

TOTAL

40
(100.0)

10
(100.0)

3
(100.0)

26
(100.0)

Disposition of Claims

Chi square=9.3611; df=3
Level of statistical significance: p=0.02
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4.

DISPOSITION OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACTIONS BY TYPES

OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS, AMONG CASES INVOLVING BOTH
"BUSINESS OF INSURANCE" AND "PREEMPTION"

ISSUES,

1946-1993 (N=114)
McCarran-Ferguson Actions Decided in
Federal Courts Before the Supreme Court's
Royal Drug Company Decision (1946-1978)
(N=38)

Disposition
of Claims

McCarran-Ferguson Actions Decided in
Federal Courts After the Supreme Court's
Royal Drug Company Decision (1980-1991)
(N=76)

Complainants Complainants
Complainants Complainants
from
from
Complainants
from
from
Complainants
Midwestern
Western
from
Midwestern
Western
from
States
States
Other States
States
States
Other States

Favorable
Outcomes for
Complainants

6
(50.0)

5
(71.4)

4
(21.1)

9
(45.0)

10
(52.6)

19
(51.4)

Unfavorable
Outcomes for
Complainants

6
(50.0)

2
(28.6)

15
(78.9)

11
(55.0)

9
(47.4)

18
(48.6)

12
(100.0)

7
(100.0)

19
(100.0)

20
(100.0)

19
(100.0)

37
(100.0)

TOTAL

Chi square=6.2468; dr=2
p--0.05

Chi squarec0.2797; df=2; p--0.86
(not statistically significant)
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5.

DISPOSITION OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACTIONS BY TYPES
OF COMPLAINANTS, AMONG CASES DECIDED BEFORE AND AFTER THE
SUPREME COURT'S "DEFINITION OF 'Boycorr"' DECISION,
TABLE

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry (N=26)
McCarran-Ferguson Actions
Decided in Federal Appellate
Courts Before the Supreme
Court's St. Paul Fire & Marine
Decision (1971-1977) (N=10)

McCarran-Ferguson Actions
Decided in Federal Appellate
Courts After the Supreme
Court's St. Paul Fire & Marine
Decision (1979-1991) (N=16)

Disposition of Claims

Individual
Complainants

Other Types of
Complainants

Individual
Complainants

Other Types of
Complainants

Favorable Outcomes
for Complainants
Unfavorable Outcomes
for Complainants

3
(75.0)
1
(25.0)

1
(16.7)
5
(83.3)

2
(22.2)
7
(77.8)

4
(57.1)
3
(42.9)

TOTAL

4
(100.0)

6
(100.0)

9
(100.0)

7
(100.0)

Likelihood Ratio=3.5548; df=l
p= 0 .05

Likelihood Ratio=2.074; df=l
p=0.14 (not statistically
significant)
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6. EFFECTS

OF SELECTED PREDICTOR VARIABLES ON THE

DECISION TO COMMENCE A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION AND ON THE
DISPOSITION OF THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON

COURTS,

Decision to Initiate a
Cause of Action in
Federal Court
(N=175)

Selected Predictor
Variables

Complainants:
* State
Commissioners
of Insurance
Defendants:
" Health-Care
Providers
* Insurers
Procedural
Questions:
" Preemption &
Federal
Antitrust Laws
" Preemption &
Various State
Laws
" Scope"Boycott"
Whether the
Action
Commenced
Before or After
the Supreme
Court's Royal
Drug Company
Decision
LAMBDA Term
("Self-Selectivity"
Bias)
CONSTANT

Probit
Coefficients
(Standard
Errors)

CLAIMS IN FEDERAL

1946-1993 (N=275)

Absolute
Values of
t-Statistics

Disposition of McCarranFerguson Claims in
Federal Courts of
Appeals
(N=152)

Disposition of McCarranFerguson Claims in
Federal Courts Among
Complainants from
Midwestern States
(N=175)

Probit
Coefficients
(Standard
Errors)

Probit
Coefficient
(Standard
Errors)

Absolute
Values of
t-Statistics

Absolute
Values of
t-Statistics

0.6377
(0.4316)

2.8711
(0.5309)

5.407****

3.7100
(0.7179)

5.167****

-0.5481

-1.0178
(0.4381)
-0.4537
(0.4158)

2.323

-0.6798

1.005

1.091

-0.0698
(0.4347)

0.160

-1.6823
(1.0663)

1.577

-1.9191
(0.8654)

2.217

-0.4859
(0.8943)

0.543

-1.3772

2.007

(0.2897)
-0.6928
(0.2931)

-2.5376
(0.2473)

10.262****

-1.2525
(0.2621)

4.778****

0.1791
(0.2140)
0.5601
(0.2218)

0.837

-

2.6813
(0.3386)

1.7222

(0.4502)

(0.6760)

(0.6860)
3.825**
3.734**

0.8026
(0.6736)
0.7447
(0.4692)

2.524

1.7317
(0.4637)

-

2.3476
(1.0889)

2.9574
(1.0345)

-0.3567
(0.5911)

-0.9053
(0.5017)

7.917"***

p <0.0001
cance:**~
Levels of Statistical
Statistical Sig
Significance:
**** p < 0.0001

01

0 0
***p< .
*** p < 0.001

**p<o.ol
** p < 0.01

2.675
1.587

*p<O.O5
* p < 0.05

